November 25, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry   A common question we get at Quilty Space is to compare Amazon Leo (formerly Kuiper) to Starlink. More specifically, people want to know if Amazon is lagging Starlink, and if so, by how much.   At the surface level, there is a clear gap. Starlink has more than 8 million subscribers running on a network of more than 8,500 satellites. Amazon Leo is pre-service with 150 satellites in orbit.   But things get interesting when comparing both constellations using their ITU filing as the start date. Applying for spectrum with the UN agency is the first step towards realizing a constellation, making it an effective place to start the clock at T-0.   The ITU received Starlink’s first filing, named STEAM-1, on June 27, 2014. It took the operator 6.3 years to go from that filing to the “Better than Nothing” beta service in October 2020.    For Amazon Leo, the ITU first received a filing under the name USASAT-NGSO-8A on March 26, 2019. Amazon Leo announced its enterprise beta service today, Nov. 24, 2025, or 6.3 years after filing.   Technical note: national regulators apply on behalf of their host constellations, so the FCC filled for Amazon, and Norway’s Nkom filed for Starlink. Companies don’t file directly.  From this, we can see that while Amazon Leo got a later start, it is progressing at almost the same speed as Starlink, lagging by a mere four months. Amazon Leo made up significant time in 2025, going from first production satellite launch to beta in seven months, nearly twice as fast as Starlink. And Amazon Leo satellites already feature laser crosslinks, a technology Starlink introduced about two and a half years after its first production launch.  Amazon Leo still has more steps to go until it reaches Starlink’s present status. Major milestones include activating full commercial service and achieving global coverage (including polar). Not owning a launch vehicle like SpaceX remains a challenge. But the operator is moving at a compelling speed, and with the heft of parent company Amazon behind it, is very, very real. To learn more about Amazon Leo and its strengths and weaknesses versus other constellations, check out our report here .  Link: https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/amazon-leo/amazon-leo-satellite-internet-ultra-pro

October 17, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry   Over the past 24 months, Iceye has won seven sovereign customers, many of them ministries of defense, for purchases of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites that the company historically built solely for its own constellation. The orders tally 21 firm satellites, plus options for 23 more (20 for Japan, 3 for Poland), excluding Iceye’s €158M domestic deal with the Finnish Defence Forces for an undisclosed number of satellites. Iceye’s latest deal, for four satellites to Japan-based IHI Corporation with options for 20 more, shows how Iceye is capitalizing on areas of geospatial growth. It's the second major foreign deal this year in Japan, following Planet Labs’ order for 10 satellites from Sky Perfect JSAT, Japan’s largest telecom satellite operator. Some satellite industry veterans have voiced concerns about manufacturing deals cannibalizing the EO customer base, as buyers of satellites may have less need to purchase third-party data from Iceye or others. This is a valid concern, but there are still compelling reasons for Iceye to continue with its current strategy. First, Iceye often sets up joint ventures with local partners (Space42 in the UAE, Rheinmetall in Germany), giving the company access to enduring revenue streams as domestic constellations are built. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there’s nothing stopping Iceye’s customers, many of them focused heavily on sovereign capabilities, from buying satellites from another manufacturer if Iceye had refused. While not every country can afford space programs with high-resolution satellites and accompanying ground infrastructure, we expect this trend to continue. Electro-optical imaging companies have signed several notable deals in the past 24 months (BlackSky with the Indonesian MoD,  Planet in Germany , and ImageSat with an undisclosed Asian customer).  Other geospatial companies have noticed this trend (Umbra, Albedo, Satellogic, etc.) and are increasingly offering space hardware deals alongside or in lieu of remote sensing data and analytics. Link: https://www.iceye.com/newsroom/press-releases/iceye-and-ihi-sign-agreement-to-build-an-earth-observation-satellite-constellation

October 7, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry A Firefly engine hot firing. Credit: Firefly Aerospace Firefly’s surprise weekend announcement that it is buying software specialist SciTec shows how aggressively the company is moving to become a full-fledged space and defense company not defined solely, or even predominantly, by launch. The $855 million deal, comprised of $300 million in cash and $555 million in stock, is nearly as much as what Firefly raised in its IPO ($868 million) just two months ago. SciTec adds 475 employees to Firefly’s ~800, growing headcount by roughly 60% and reshaping Firefly into a bigger contender for Golden Dome work. Compared with the other U.S. launch companies that went public this decade – Rocket Lab and Virgin Orbit – Firefly’s evolution is the most rapid from a financial standpoint. In its first few months as a public entity, Firefly is outpacing what Rocket Lab spent in four years on M&A. Why the urgency? First, it’s conventional wisdom now that launch as a standalone offering is a hard business, especially absent a large government anchor contract, which Firefly lacks. The total market is only $5-7 billion dollars per annum, which is then divided into smaller buckets defined by launch mass, orbital inclination, and national sovereignty. Firefly already expanded beyond launch in years prior with its lunar landers and Elytra multi-mission spacecraft, but the foray into defense expands its total addressable market by an order of magnitude. Rocket Lab, a peer competitor, demonstrated the effectiveness of diversifying into spacecraft manufacturing and defense over the course of six acquisitions since 2021. Virgin Orbit, on the other hand, adopted the novel approach of making minority investments into potential customers (SatRevolution, Arqit, Horizon Technologies, etc.), which left the company with no tangible revenue-producing assets when its launch business stumbled. As a result, the company was liquidated two years after its IPO. (To be fair, Virgin Orbit was late to the SPAC IPO fad, and the $228M it raised was less than half the company's target, leaving it more cash strapped than comparable launch IPOs). Second, missile defense is hot, and that’s with or without Golden Dome. SciTec is a subcontractor under General Dynamics Mission Systems for the ground segment of the Space Development Agency’s PWSA missile warning constellation, and counts the Missile Defense Agency among its customers. Future spending on Golden Dome amplifies this market opportunity. Third, software talent is an increasingly needed but tough skill set for space companies to obtain, especially in the age of AI. Acquiring SciTech enables Firefly to quickly acqui-hire a talented pool of software engineers rather than manually scraping together the capability through a laborious and lengthy hiring process. SciTec is a cash-flow positive business, and as a software company, likely has margins that surpass what Firefly obtains from its hardware-centric business. The acquisition puts Firefly on an accelerated track to profitability with the workforce and product offerings needed to capitalize on the surge in U.S. missile defense spending. Link: https://investors.fireflyspace.com/events/event-details/firefly-aerospace-announces-acquisition-scitec

October 3, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry DLR antennas in Neustrelitz. Credit: DLR (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) The blessing and curse of European space policy is the continent’s “do it together” approach. By pooling spending through the European Space Agency and the European Union (two separate entities), Europe can do far more collectively than it can as two dozen separate countries. The tradeoff, however, is that countries must sacrifice some of their individual goals for the sake of the group. The collective approach worked well for several key projects, like the Copernicus remote sensing fleet, the Galileo navigation constellation, and various space exploration programs (Gaia, Euclid, etc.). But in recent years, it’s grown clear that Germany was feeling hamstrung on national priorities. On launch, Germany was less enthused  than France about subsidizing Ariane 6 and more interested in supporting domestic startups. On the IRIS 2  constellation, Germany called the program too expensive , and last year dismissed it as “ too French. ” And in June, Germany’s DLR gave a tepid response to the pan-European remote sensing constellation, European Resilience from Space (ERS), now in the planning phases. Alongside these fissures, Bundeswehr the German military, started mulling a national constellation of hundreds of satellites, a conversation that spilled into the open  in April.  Last week, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius pledged €35B ($41B) through 2030 on an array of military space programs. This was followed by Major General Michael Traut outlining high-level plans for this constellation  of hundreds of satellites doing everything from telecom and imaging to RF mapping and missile warning. The final push for this sovereign constellation was not EU friction, but a strained relationship with the U.S. and Russian aggression on the ground and in orbit. Germany’s surging space spending could radically reshape the country and Europe. Already, Germany is the world’s fourth-largest defense spender , following the U.S., Russia, and China, but space was not a major area of investment. Now, per Handelsblatt, space spending is poised to increase sixfold, adding the equivalent of ESA’s annual budget to Germany’s domestic programs every year for the next five years. What does this mean for Germany’s space sector? Already, there is a heavy expectation that German companies will be best positioned to benefit from the spending surge. Spacecraft manufacturer OHB’s stock price doubled after Pistorius’s speech. Creating a constellation of the size and scope described by Gen. Traut will impact all elements of the space ecosystem and will illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of Germany’s space sector. How German can the constellation be, and to what extent will the vision depend on the whole of Europe? Quilty Space evaluated the following areas: Launch.  Launching a constellation of hundreds of satellites will require a serious launch effort. This will put pressure on Germany’s emerging small launch providers like Isar Aerospace, HyImpulse and RFA. Germany has several of the world’s premier launch startups, but all are building small rockets with between 500-1,500 kg of capacity to low Earth orbit. For a raft of reasons (cost, cadence, schedule), no megaconstellation has launched on small rockets. Starlink, OneWeb, Amazon, and Telesat all rely on medium or heavy-lift rockets that can deploy satellites by the dozens. This will put pressure on German launch startups to build bigger rockets, and in the near term, positions Arianespace as the key launch provider. Love it or hate it, the Ariane 6 is the only European launch vehicle capable of quickly deploying a constellation (and it doesn’t hurt that the upper stage is built in Germany ). Satellite manufacturing.  OHB is skilled at building remote sensing and navigation satellites, but the range of payloads required for the future German constellation will demand more skill sets. Satellite communications is not one of OHB’s strengths, and there are no public German radiofrequency mapping companies, suggesting this is also a new skillset requirement. Infrared missile-warning sensors share some technical heritage with weather satellites, but adaptation is non-trivial. If Germany wants to speedily deploy a multi-purpose constellation, it will have to rely on a whole-of-Europe approach while new competencies are built up domestically. This is also true at the component level. Germany is adept at building optical crosslinks and solar arrays, but it will need to industrialize dozens of components (propulsion, reaction wheels, etc.) if it wants a domestic supply chain that can support a megaconstellation. Ground segment.  Germany is home to some prominent teleports, both independent (Media Broadcast Satellite, IABG, Talia, Horizon) and corporate (SES, ABS, Hispasat), that could anchor a future constellation. Germany is also home to the second-highest number of data centers in the world  after the U.S., providing lots of potential host sites for constellation ground infrastructure. The data routing and processing needs of a multi-purpose constellation will be significant, given the large volumes of data generated and the need, especially with missile warning, for low latency. If not done well, this could handicap a constellation, a la GPS-3, MUOS and OneWeb. The leading vendors for ground segment equipment (gateways, not terminals) are in the U.S., Israel, and Spain. Ensuring sovereign ground will require maturing this sector alongside manufacturing and launch.   Link: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/weltraumkongress-verteidigungsminister-sicherheit-5996640

September 24, 2025 - Written by Quilty Space Credit: Quilty Space Quilty Space attended the annual World Space Business Week in Paris last week. Our French could use some work, but fortunately, we’re fluent in the language of the space industry. Over the course of the week, Quilty Space noticed several emerging trends based on dozens of meetings and hallway conversations. The following (non-exhaustive) list covers the biggest themes that stood out to us from the conference. DTD is king. Already a perennial hot topic, this year’s DTD conversations were amplified by SpaceX’s $17 billion spectrum deal with EchoStar and the unveiling of Equatys – a Space42/Viasat-backed venture to provide global DTD services with pooled MSS spectrum. Meanwhile, MDA Space, still reeling from the loss of its $1.3B EchoStar order, insisted that its DTD pipeline remains active and perhaps accelerating. While a handful of stocks (most notably ASTS, IRDM, and MDA) sold off on the news, the overall industry buzz toward DTD leans positive, given the potential for billion-dollar orders that are badly needed to support the flood of new smallsat manufacturers, component vendors, and providers that have entered the market in recent years. Ground segment heats up. The traditionally sleepy ground segment is suddenly getting interesting as both the satcom and EO industries adapt to technology, market, and competitive change. In the satcom world, there is a move toward higher frequencies in the millimeter bands (Q/V/E/W) and even optical. Meanwhile, even as LEO broadband and DTD constellations build out hundreds of new gateways, it appears the teleport segment is finally undergoing terrestrial-type consolidation with EQT’s Satport emerging as the likely consolidator. In the EO world, the drive for lower latency has prompted the deployment of dozens of new antennas and sites by traditional ground players. New ideas are abounding, ranging from infrastructure-sharing startups (Skynopy, Infostellar) to dedicated relay constellations by startups (Apolink) and even the industry’s market leader, KSAT (Hyper). The gravity of Kuiper. Amazon’s megaconstellation still faces industry skepticism, but with ~100 satellites on orbit and more on the way, conversations are shifting from “is Kuiper real?” to “will Kuiper do X, Y, or Z?” In the consumer market, Kuiper stands alone in its willingness to compete head-on with Starlink. We're also starting to see inroads into other markets, like aviation with JetBlue. So far, Amazon has held its cards close, but the consensus is that Kuiper will be disruptive to any market it touches and will seriously challenge the multi-orbit business case when multi-LEO becomes a viable option. The ongoing launch supply crunch. Even without Amazon’s 2022 order for up to 83 launches, the heavy lift launch market was destined to face a mid-decade supply crunch due to forklift upgrades of long-serving ULA and Arianespace launch vehicles (Atlas 5, Ariane 5). Both launch vehicles are years late to market, and Blue Origin (a new market entrant) has only managed one launch YTD vs. an original forecast of 8-10 launches. Meanwhile, the situation is only marginally better in the small/medium lift market, where only Rocket Lab (Electron) has yet managed to fly regularly and reliably. There’s always the SpaceX rideshare option, but the thrice-annual Transporter missions are sold out through mid-2027. The supply crunch should ease as new launch vehicles (i.e., Firefly, Relativity, Rocket Lab, Stoke Space) come online over the next two years, but if history is any guide, the supply crunch may last longer than generally anticipated. In-space platforms evolve from tugs to Cadillacs. What started as a wave of Orbital Transfer Vehicles for moving cubesats around has evolved into a stronger, beefier class of in-space vehicles capable of a much wider range of services. Impulse Space is the poster child for this new class of vehicles, announcing GEO transfer missions with Anduril , Astranis and Infinite Orbits during WSBW, all of which need high-velocity support. Others like Firefly (Elytra), ULA (Centaur-5) and Quantum Space/Arrow (Ranger) are also producing vehicles that don't just transport spacecraft between orbits, but host payloads for situational awareness, edge compute and other services. U.S. defense needs and commercial small GEO are the emerging drivers.

September 5, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry Credit: Quilty Space Three years ago, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the global space industry experienced the immediate removal of the flagship Soyuz medium-lift rocket, as well as the less active but still significant Proton heavy-lift rocket. Two months later, Amazon Kuiper purchased upwards of 83 launches across Arianespace, Blue Origin, and United Launch Alliance, vacuuming up a massive portion of global launch capacity at a time when a supply-demand imbalance was quickly emerging. Completing the trifecta of shortage-inducing events, Arianespace, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and ULA were all in the throes of transitioning from venerable but dated rockets to next-generation launchers, resulting in a ramp down of the tried and true in favor of the untested and new. All took two to three years longer than expected to debut, and have yet to achieve a high operational cadence. SpaceX’s unprecedented scaling from 31 launches in 2021 to 136 launches in 2024 enabled the industry to avoid a launch crisis. But with Amazon poised to consume one-third or more of all new heavy lift capacity for the next 2-3 years, the industry is likely to remain supply-constrained through the balance of the decade. That could pose a problem for some of the many large constellations on the horizon. Additional constellations awaiting launch in that time period include: AST SpaceMobile for an initial 45-60 satellites, with long-term plans for 90-95, then potentially hundreds. Initial satellites are launching mainly with SpaceX and Blue Origin. Eutelsat for 440 interim satellites to maintain the OneWeb constellation. Initial satellites appear set to launch on H3 rockets from MHI. EchoStar’s 100-satellite direct-to-device constellation, for which no launch contracts have been announced. Telesat’s Lightspeed constellation of 156-198 satellites, currently booked on 14 Falcon 9 rockets with SpaceX. The Space Development Agency’s PWSA constellation of several hundred satellites, plus any additional capabilities added via Golden Dome. These constellations and additional speculative fleets (Kuiper Gen-2, Yahsat/Viasat DTD, SES’s next-gen MEO) add to launch demand over the rest of the decade. This presents an opportunity for new players that can provide affordable, reliable and routine access to space. New “constellation-optimized” rockets are on the horizon. Rocket Lab recently completed the launch pad for Neutron in Virginia, Relativity has started printing propulsion hardware for multiple Terran R rockets, and Firefly raised $868 million in its IPO to support the Eclipse rocket, among other projects. All three are expected to debut in 2026. Whether or not the market can support six medium to heavy lift launch providers from the U.S. alone – plus Starship – is an open question, but for the remainder of the decade launch demand is likely to remain high, presenting an opportunity for one or more new players to establish themselves in the pecking order. Link: https://rocketlabcorp.com/updates/rocket-lab-opens-launch-complex-3-a-critical-milestone-on-the-path-to-neutrons-first-launch/

August 5, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry A Quilty Space chart counting the success rate of debut launches for orbital-class Western rockets. The space industry has learned to treat first launch attempts with grace, given the elevated failure risk compared to later missions, as evidenced by the warm reception Gilmour Space received after the 14-second debut of its Eris rocket. From the beginning of the decade to present day, 16 new Western orbital-class rockets reached their launch pads for the first time – more than twice the number from 2000-2019 – but only four successfully completed their missions. And, the names of those who succeeded from the jump are mostly what has been branded “oldspace.” The four flawless debuts of the decade were Avio with Vega C, Boeing with SLS, Blue Origin with New Glenn, and ULA with Vulcan.* The takeaway is clear: experience has its merits. Every player that succeeded on their maiden flight had knowledge from older rockets (mostly orbital, except for Blue Origin, which was solely a suborbital launch provider until this year). Despite the hard times for new entrants, investor sentiment hasn’t waned. Launch startups continue to pull in impressive rounds, like Isar Aerospace’s €150M round in June, Firefly’s $50M investment from Northrop Grumman in May, and Astra’s $80M round disclosed in April. Big names continue to gravitate to the sector as well, like billionaire Eric Schmidt taking the helm  at Relativity Space in March, Turkish defense prime Roketsan’s unveiling of an orbital rocket last month ( slated for 2027),  and Japanese car maker Honda’s surprisingly clean  suborbital reusable demonstrator launch in June. A successful debut launch doesn’t always mean clear skies (see Vulcan’s second launch), and many startups have embraced the SpaceX philosophy of learning as you go (Starship is nine missions in and not yet commercially operational). But at a time when constellations, and soon Golden Dome, have strained global launch capacity, proving success with speed means a lot.   *Arianespace’s Ariane 6 was not counted because it failed to deploy customer payloads despite reaching orbit.

August 7, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry Credit: Quilty Space  Few countries have been as forward-leaning when rolling out universal broadband access as Australia. In 2009, the country set up the National Broadband Network Company (NBN Co., later just NBN) to deploy connectivity infrastructure across the world’s sixth largest nation. While the main focus of that push was fiber and other terrestrial hardware, NBN realized it would need satellites to connect the more than 3 million citizens living in rural or remote regions. And so the ~AUD $2 billion Sky Muster program was born: two high-throughput (HTS) geostationary satellites, launched in 2015 and 2016, bringing a collective 135 Gbps  of capacity, a 30-fold increase in Australia’s satcom supply. Even with that huge leap, Sky Muster was plagued with low data speeds within two years of launch , accompanied by a steady stream of local complaints . The service struggled to keep up with rising data speeds uncomfortably early into the satellites’ 15-year design lives. Sky Muster peaked in 2021 with around 111,000 subscribers, but once Starlink entered the Australian market, it never recovered. NBN kicked off an AUD $750M network upgrade  in 2022 that added fixed wireless tower access to more than 120,000 homes and businesses whose only choice was Sky Muster. Completed in December 2024, the Fixed Wireless and Satellite Upgrade Program (FWSUP) was meant to reduce network congestion, but that effort was insufficient to prevent customer attrition. In 2023, the same year Starlink eclipsed Sky Muster subscribers, NBN began exploring connectivity options  from low Earth orbit providers. At the time, Jason Ashton, NBN Co Executive General Manager for Fixed Wireless and Satellite, framed the evaluation as exploratory, saying LEO connectivity “could be a part of our network in the future.” With this week’s announcement between NBN and Amazon’s Project Kuiper, it would appear the future is now, and the future is LEO. NBN wants Kuiper to cover more than 300,000 locations, and anticipates service in mid-2026. LEO broadband networks have the potential to scale well beyond the size of GEO satellite fleets, allowing operators to steadily increase total capacity. Sky Muster didn’t scale, and improvements in network capacity weren’t enough to keep customers from jumping to commercial LEO solutions. The writing was on the wall for years. Now, Kuiper just needs to get its satellites on orbit and its service deployed. Link: https://www.nbnco.com.au/corporate-information/media-centre/media-statements/nbn-co-selects-amazons-project-kuiper

June 19, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry On June 18, Eutelsat OneWeb secured the kind of deal that had eluded the company for years – a large government contract worth up to €1 billion ($1.15 billion) for defense communications services. The French Armed Forces (DGA) contract covers 10 years, and ensures priority access to Eutelsat capacity, especially in LEO, plus funding to upgrade the constellation for military use. The deal is important for several reasons. 1.      Less USG business. Eutelsat’s government revenue, despite growing 10% last quarter to €49.5 million, took a hit when the U.S. military reduced its business with the company, something management attributed to Trump cost-cutting efforts (perhaps DOGE). These and other policy shifts in Washington make it increasingly important for Eutelsat to have government clients outside the U.S. 2.      More domestic support.  Europe and Eutelsat OneWeb have talked extensively about communications sovereignty for the past two years, but actions weren’t matching words. It was blindingly obvious that for a continent at war, and with deep reservations about dependence on Starlink, waiting six years for IRIS² wasn’t a reasonable solution. The French MoD deal is the most visible sign of a European government pushing to make sovereign LEO connectivity a near-term reality. That this came from France was not a surprise, as France owns a 12.6% stake in Eutelsat through BpiFrance. 3.      Feckless UK posture.  Ever since being purchased out of bankruptcy in 2020 by the British government and Bharti, OneWeb sought to craft a meaningful defense deal with the U.K. Ministry of Defense, but the U.K. was largely unwilling to make major commitments after its one-time $500M rescue deal. The British government was, among other things, paralyzed by the idea of playing favorites between local operators (then OneWeb, Inmarsat and Avanti), making it an ineffectual shareholder. Three years after the Russia-Ukraine War started, the British government never sent  OneWeb terminals to Ukraine. Most satellite operators draw a meaningful portion of their revenue from government customers. Quilty Space estimates Starlink generated $2.2 billion in government revenue in 2024 (mostly from Starshield), about 28% of Starlink’s total for the year. Intelsat generated $386 million from government customers in 2024, representing 19%  of total revenue. Eutelsat is in the same ballpark, with government revenue accounting for 17% of Q3 revenue, and 14% of its last fiscal year (€165M out of €1.2B as of June 30, 2024). With French MoD backing, Eutelsat OneWeb now has a substantial domestic anchor customer, providing the company with improved stability as it seeks to finance 440 interim LEO satellites as well as the IRIS² constellation (€4.0-4.2B collectively, per Eutelsat’s estimate). Government revenue alone isn’t enough to validate the LEO business case, but it’s a meaningful part, and one that OneWeb, as part of Eutelsat, can finally count on. Source: https://www.eutelsat.com/en/news/press.html#/pressreleases/eutelsat-and-frances-armed-forces-ministry-reach-landmark-framework-agreement-for-low-orbit-satellite-services-in-the-context-of-frances-nexus-program-3392412

July 15, 2025 - Written by Quilty Space News broke July 10 that a SpaceX Starlink subsidiary called Starlink Satellite Services Corp. (SSSC) submitted an annual financial report in the Netherlands, providing a rare glimpse at the inner workings of the world’s largest satellite constellation. The numbers were surprising: $2.7B in 2024 revenue, up from $1.4B in 2023, and a net income of $72.7M for 2024, up from a loss of $30.7M the year prior. At face value, they suggest Starlink makes far less than we at Quilty, and other analysts like Mach33 and Payload project. So much less, that Starlink would no longer be considered SpaceX’s biggest moneymaker compared to launch. Starlink 2024 revenue estimate Quilty Space $7.8B Payload Research $8.1B Mach33/Ark Invest $6.9B (including Starshield) Is SSSC a true assessment of Starlink’s financial performance? Did Starlink only generate about half the revenue of rival Viasat ($4.5B) or moderately more than GEO and MEO giant SES ($2.3B) in 2024? At Quilty, we believe the Dutch financial document provides only a partial view of Starlink’s financial performance, resulting in an incomplete picture. The first clue is SSSC’s regional revenue breakdown, which places Europe as its largest market and North America fourth, despite the U.S. being Starlink’s largest base of consumer subscribers. For North America to rank so low, SSSC would likely only count Canada (and possibly Mexico). Canada had roughly 400,000 subscribers in 2024. The Quilty Space Starlink model estimates Starlink’s 2024 global consumer revenue at $4.9B, of which $2.7B came from the U.S. market and its then-1.5 million subscribers. The second clue is the company headcount: 14 people. SpaceX has more than 13,000 employees, of which roughly 3,000 work for Starlink. SSSC doesn’t remotely reflect Starlink’s true employee base. Third, SSSC focuses on consumer and enterprise customers, but does not appear to count government revenue, especially Starshield and other U.S. military work. NRO’s $1.8B satellite constellation is notably absent. Starlink also pulled in 97% of proliferated LEO task orders under Space Systems Command’s pLEO IDIQ as of late 2024 (the contract vehicle has a ceiling of $13 billion, giving Starlink even more room to grow in 2025). That too, appears missing in the SSSC filing. In conclusion, SSSC is a holding company created for legal and tax purposes that doesn’t tell us much about Starlink’s underlying financials. Forget revenues and margins, the big takeaway from the SSSC filing is that Starlink itself is presented essentially as an asset-light holding company. The real assets (i.e., the satellites, associated factories, gateways, and user terminals) remain on SpaceX's books. That decision has implications for the value ascribed to Starlink in an IPO scenario, and says a lot about where Elon Musk seeks to accrue value between his space enterprises.  Link: https://www.pcmag.com/news/how-much-does-starlink-make-this-document-offers-a-glimpse

July 14, 2025 - Written by Chris Quilty Credit: Quilty Space On July 11, Firefly Aerospace filed S-1 paperwork with the SEC, becoming the fourth space company seeking to go public in 2025. The announcement, coming just halfway through the year, puts 2025 on track to be the best year for space IPOs since 2021, when 13 companies went public. To be fair, space IPOs have never quite been a thing. Prior to 2021, the peak year for space IPOs was 2016, when five companies went public (four IPOs, one SPAC), raising $124M. By contrast, the two IPOs completed YTD (Karman and Voyager) raised $625M, with Firefly and iRocket (SPAC) yet to be priced. This recent burst in IPO activity is both welcome and long overdue, given the hundreds of space startups established over the past decade. Through the first half of this year alone, ~$3B of venture capital has flowed into the space industry, compared to $460M in all of 2016. Those startups will eventually need an exit path via M&A or IPO. Both markets have been in a three-year drought but have recently shown signs of life. Pitchbook’s 2025 mid-year VC outlook  forecasts valuation growth, increased fundraising, and rising distribution yields in the second half of the year. Equity markets are fickle, but if the IPO window remains open in the second half of the year, we would expect several companies to test the waters, led by the roughly two dozen private companies that have completed large ($100M+), late-stage funding rounds in the past five years.  And don’t look now, but a SPAC market rebound  could prompt a flurry of IPO activity not seen since the halcyon days of 2021. With less roadkill than last time, we can only hope.   Link: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1860160/000119312525158225/d849748ds1.htm

July 17, 2025 - Written by Chris Quilty With today’s completion of the SES-Intelsat merger, the era of “The Big Four” is officially over. That’s just the math. But it’s also a sign of something bigger: the center of gravity in satcom has shifted permanently away from GEO incumbents to LEO disruptors. And SES knows it.   To be fair, the decline of GEO’s dominance has been obvious for years. The unraveling has been accelerated by the rise of LEO megaconstellations, stagnating broadcast revenues, and growing demand for mobility, cloud integration, and low-latency connectivity. One by one, the legacy GEO giants have responded in kind:   Telesat is walking away from GEO entirely in favor of LEO with LightSpeed. Eutelsat absorbed OneWeb to hedge its bets with a multi-orbit move. UAE-based Yahsat merged with AI firm Bayanat to reposition around analytics and sovereign data. JSAT is pouring capital into EO and related verticals. After acquiring Inmarsat, Viasat is now teasing DTD services and other multi-orbit offerings.   SES, Post-Merger: Now What?   SES may have bought Intelsat, but it didn’t buy time. The new combined company is still projecting modest growth of mid-single digits on revenue and EBITDA through 2028. That’s… respectable, but hardly the stuff that lights up earnings calls in a market racing toward LEO disruption and DTD innovation.   The merger prompted a CFO change, but not a shift in strategic posture. Its near-term priorities are clear: integrate Intelsat, cut costs, and reduce leverage. Longer term, SES must chart a strategy that not only fends off emerging LEO competitors but also accelerates growth beyond its current high-single-digit targets.   Building a LEO constellation to compete with Starlink, Kuiper, or Lightspeed is probably off the table ($10-20B commitment). And an SES-owned MEO constellation in Europe is now called Iris2 – a publicly funded initiative that SES may support but won’t control and is unlikely to generate meaningful revenue for the company before the early 2030s.   SES is eyeing adjacent markets: DTD, IoT, optical networks, SSA, quantum, cloud-based satcom, and AI. Some of these could move the needle later this decade, particularly in areas such as government payload hosting and sovereign infrastructure. Others remain speculative or require long-tail infrastructure bets.   Even with a pristine balance sheet, SES can’t match SpaceX’s financial firepower (est. 2025 capex of $5.5B). Still, SES has other powerful levers: valuable spectrum, orbital rights, landing rights across key markets, and a mature global partner network. These assets position SES to compete in high-value segments, like government, mobility, and managed services, where regulatory moats and long procurement cycles tend to favor incumbents. If deployed strategically, they could become powerful growth catalysts. And with tailwinds from IRIS² and growing demand for sovereign-controlled infrastructure, SES is well-positioned to align with European public-sector priorities as well. Add the right set of strategic moves — deeper telecom alliances, targeted vertical integration, or a Ku-band expansion of mPower — and the merged entity could carve out a credible, differentiated position in a market increasingly defined by LEO, software-defined networks, and multi-orbit flexibility.   Which path SES ultimately takes remains to be seen. But we have no doubt that standing still won’t be part of its journey.

11/20/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry ABL Space Systems’ sudden pivot from space launch to missile defense is the latest example of a growing trend among small launch hopefuls for whom the market never quite materialized. The El Segundo, California, company was considered among the most promising startups in small launch, but a failed launch attempt in 2023, a rocket-destroying ground test in July 2024, and a tough capital market pushed the company to abandon space launch Nov. 14 in favor of to-be-named missile defense programs.  Only a handful of prominent U.S. launch startups, namely Relativity Space and Stoke Space, have stayed laser-focused on the space launch market. Per the non-exhaustive chart above, ABL joins a growing list of companies that have either diversified into defense, or abandoned space entirely for defense work. Why does this keep happening?  Most of these companies are now pursuing hypersonics, a $ 6 - 7 B market, making it about the same size as the global space launch market . Since propulsion technology is dual use, it’s clear why startups are drawn to a quick way of doubling their TAM. Then there’s the harsh reality that several small launch startups bet on winning deals with megaconstellations, but those have gone almost exclusively to larger rockets. Given how overcrowded the launch startup space got in the late 2010s, the industry expected most of them to fail, and while many have or will, a larger than anticipated number will live on as part of the U.S. military industrial base.   European launch startups so far have not exhibited the same push towards hypersonics/missile defense, as most of the market is with the U.S. military. Only Avio, which isn’t a startup but was overwhelmingly concentrated on space launch, has made such a pivot, and it did so by expanding to the U.S. market . Australian startups have also either expanded into hypersonics (Gilmour Space), or planned dual use from the beginning (Hypersonix Launch Systems). The latter of which, like Avio, tapped into the U.S. market to jumpstart its hypersonic growth story. The recent expansion of the trilateral AUKUS agreement between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. to include hypersonic testing , may pave the way for British space startups to make similar moves.

May 5, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry First, it was small launch vehicles. Then it was cubesat constellation operators. Now, the latest area of unbridled space-industry expansion is small satellite manufacturing. The past 12 months have seen several developments in the smallsat manufacturing domain, notably: Large capital raises , like Apex Space’s $200M Series C, a $170M Series C for Loft Orbital , and a $110M Series B by K2 Space; Hiring surges  by Berlin Space Technologies  (50% increase in three months), MDA Space  (950 new employees in 2024) and Millennium Space  (quintupling in size over seven years); New factories  across the U.S. and Europe from AerospaceLab  (an 11,000-square-meter “megafactory” in Belgium, and a 3,300 square-meter plant in Torrance, California), Argotec  (11,500 square meters in Turin, Italy), and Terran Orbital (8,700 square meters in Irvine, CA); and A major uptick in space-as-a-service  deals from Planet, Spire and Iceye – three companies that originally built satellites only for in-house needs. Bubble risk?  It’s not clear what is motivating all of this expansion. Yes, U.S. government demand has increased through the Space Development Agency, but the commercial sector, not so much. If this supply is growing without sufficient demand to match it, the industry risks a reset like it saw with small launch and cubesat constellation operators. Both of those had surges in entrepreneurship during the 2010s motivated by grossly overestimated market sizes. At the end of the day, 100+ small launch vehicle startups yielded one disruptor in the form of Rocket Lab. Among cubesat startups, dozens of constellations across Earth observation and IoT connectivity thinned out to two leaders: Planet Labs and Spire. In launch, anticipated constellation demand went to heavier rockets, while in cubesat constellations, end users proved harder to capture than anticipated. What’s different?  A nontrivial amount of the surge in manufacturing capacity is clearly demand-driven. MDA is scaling up to build Telesat Lightspeed and Globalstar, and Millennium is building more satellites for the U.S. government, for example. Among space-as-a-service companies, pivots to use their in-house production capabilities for third-party customers provides meaningful revenue diversification from slow-growing EO markets. That said, commercial demand signals haven’t changed much. The largest constellations, SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper, are vertically integrated and off the market. Commercial direct-to-device constellations are on the horizon, but only some will go to merchant suppliers while others are also built in-house (AST SpaceMobile, Lynk). Most EO satellite manufacturers build their own spacecraft, with demand driven primarily by government contracts. Investors should exercise caution before jumping on the satellite manufacturing bandwagon. Or plan on bringing a big checkbook if they do.

Apr 23 - Written by Caleb Henry As the next big LEO constellation, Kuiper’s delays have attracted significant attention, but the question of how serious the delays are has gone unanswered. A comparative analysis of other large LEO constellations shows Kuiper is moving at a pace consistent with early industry precedent. If Kuiper’s April 28 launch date holds, it will take the company 570 days to go from prototype launch to first batch launch. That’s 115 days longer than Starlink, and more than 200 days longer than OneWeb, but faster than the U.S. Space Development Agency by about 70 days. Serial satellite manufacturing consistently takes the industry longer to achieve than early estimates. Starlink hoped to do as many as seven batch launches in its first year but only completed two in 2019. OneWeb aimed for as many as five but finished its first production year with just one launch. SDA planned a one-year gap, but contractor struggles and covid-induced setbacks doubled that time. And Telesat (not included in the chart), launched a prototype for its Lightspeed constellation in 2018, and has still yet to conduct a batch launch – the first is now slated for the second half of 2026. Common reasons for delays include supply chain partners falling behind on parts deliveries, manufacturer redesigns that incorporate data from prototypes in orbit, and chronically underestimated learning curves when shifting from artisanal production into a mass manufacturing operation. Precedent suggests Kuiper’s delays are normal and should resolve themselves as momentum builds. Plus, given the magnitude of Kuiper’s investment – estimated at $16.5-20 billion by Quilty Space, the FCC is fully expected to grant an extension on the company’s spectrum license. All Amazon needs to do now is execute. Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-23/amazon-project-kuiper-space-internet-struggles-to-catch-elon-musk-s-starlink

Apr 24 - Written by Kimberly Siversen Burke In a move that feels equal parts shocking as it is on-brand, SpaceX just flashed its orbital watchdog badge to the FCC in what is being characterized as a “transparent attempt to hijack competition, hinder innovation, and impair national security.” Channeling a DOGE-inspired lawfare vibe, SpaceX is now weaponizing Starlink to form some sort of on-orbit Department of Spectrum Enforcement. DOSE (our acronym, not theirs) is collecting Power Spectral Density (PSD) data over the 2 GHz band across the Northeastern U.S., Western U.S., and Alaska – territory where EchoStar (parent of Dish Networks) holds licenses for both Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) and terrestrial 5G use under the FCC’s (AWS-4)  designation. Simply put: SpaceX just deployed a spectrum spy op to make EchoStar look like a squatter. The goal seems less enforcement than eviction. Basically, if you’re not using your spectrum, Elon will. And the way things are going, the FCC might even DOSE you into forfeiting it. SpaceX is DOSEing up with Data This long-simmering regulatory clash between SpaceX and EchoStar reached a boiling point on April 14 . Through PSD data collected by Starlink satellites, SpaceX illustrated  for the FCC its claim that EchoStar uses just 5% of its licensed AWS-4 spectrum – a figure that, if accurate, contradicts years of buildout milestones. Image Credit: SpaceX FCC Filing (WT Docket No. 22-212; RM-11976; ICFS File No. SES-RWL-20241213-02647)   Starlink’s satellites¹ essentially acted as passive RF monitors, scanning the 2 GHz band over parts of the U.S., specifically, the Northeast, West, and Alaska. Possibly not by accident, the areas surveyed may include some of the most sparsely populated zones within EchoStar’s AWS-4 footprint. Think Jersey City vs. Jasper. Data from this surveillance mission showed that while adjacent frequencies lit up with signal activity, EchoStar’s AWS-4 spectrum remained quiet by comparison. While we would expect spectrum watchdogging  from RF signal mapping players like HawkEye 360, Starlink acting as a space-based spectrum spy was not on our bingo card. Worth noting that SpaceX doesn’t appear to be deploying any new payloads. It’s likely reprogramming and tasking Starlink’s advanced phased array beamforming and digital signal processing technologies  to conduct the passive spectrum audits. EchoStar’s Counterpunch EchoStar clapped back at SpaceX for orchestrating a regulatory ambush and attempting to rewrite FCC precedent through media spectacle. In an April 15 filing  and a statement to Octus , EchoStar accuses SpaceX of its “familiar pattern”  of “distorting the truth while missing the point” and dismisses SpaceX’s PSD scans as irrelevant. EchoStar goes on to explain that AWS-4 buildout obligations are population-based , not geographic: “Perhaps SpaceX is confused because it has never publicly filed a detailed deployment report for the 15,000 MHz of spectrum it received free of charge from the FCC.” Contrast, as they did, with EchoStar’s own track record of investing more than $30B in wireless spectrum licenses and $7.3B+ in capex to build out a nationwide 5G network. The company also pointed to the FCC’s September 2023  determination that Dish Networks met its 70% population coverage requirement and cited third-party certification of EchoStar’s March 2024  nationwide drive tests. With 23,000+ 5G sites online, EchoStar now claims to be the largest Open RAN network in the country. The rebuttal painted SpaceX not as a champion of efficiency, but as a spectrum opportunist trying to kneecap EchoStar’s emerging DTD strategy, just as its first Lyra satellite (launched in January 2025 aboard SpaceX’s Transporter-12 mission ) begins operations under an FCC experimental authorization. EchoStar also dismissed SpaceX's criticism of temporary spectrum leasing  as irrelevant, clarifying that the leases were approved by the FCC as part of a 5G milestone extension agreement to foster interim spectrum use by smaller operators and Tribal nations during EchoStar’s network buildout. SpaceX Reloads On April 18 , SpaceX submitted a follow-up letter to the FCC, reinforcing its earlier claims and openly ridiculing EchoStar for offering no meaningful rebuttal to the spectral data presented. Instead of addressing the core issue of underutilized spectrum, EchoStar “attacks the messenger,” SpaceX said, and fails to explain “the measured wasteland in the AWS-4 band.” More provocatively, SpaceX asserted that the FCC has never validated EchoStar’s drive test claims, despite EchoStar suggesting otherwise. SpaceX is now urging the Commission to revisit EchoStar’s buildout filings to assess whether the milestones were meaningfully met or just rubber-stamped. SpaceX also mocked EchoStar’s effort to anchor its AWS-4 spectrum rights to the launch of a single, foreign-licensed NGSO satellite (Lyra-1),  calling the legal logic “bizarre.” If EchoStar admits that NGSO operations are viable in the band, SpaceX argues, “the Commission should allow more NGSO operations in the band.” EchoStar's Latest Salvo: We Built This, Back Off On April 23 , EchoStar returned fire in yet another FCC Filing, accusing SpaceX of inventing an unrecognized standard for compliance to upend decades of licensing framework. The filing warns the Commission that allowing SpaceX’s interpretation to stand would violate FCC precedent, undermine EchoStar’s dual-use MSS + 5G architecture, and trigger harmful interference scenarios the AWS-4 Order aimed to avoid. EchoStar emphasized the FCC's explicit certification of its AWS-4 deployment, reiterated its leadership in 3GPP’s non-terrestrial network (NTN) standardization work, and boasted about an audit that ranked Boost Mobile  — powered by its network — as the most reliable in New York City. Also, National Security and China. Globalstar’s Big LEO Lockdown Meanwhile, Globalstar has been fortifying its own defenses to protect its Big LEO  spectrum from the de facto leader of DOSE. In an April 10  meeting with the FCC’s Space Bureau and Commissioner Carr’s staff (note: not Carr), it pressed for swift approval of its C-3 constellation  without first detonating a rulemaking that would blow open the back door for SpaceX  to share its 1.6/2.4 GHz band. That’s not paranoia. SpaceX already filed a petition  in February 2024 to dismantle Big LEO’s exclusive use. That proposed rulemaking [RM-11975]  is still on the docket. In an April 15  ex parte filing, Globalstar framed the C-3 System as the next evolutionary leap for DTD to bolster its existing SPOT devices, IoT offerings, and iPhone SOS integration. Globalstar warned that even initiating a new Big LEO rulemaking would undermine investment certainty, derail commercial momentum, and jeopardize a framework that “supports the provision of MSS to more people globally than any other satellite band.” If (when?) that petition advances, Globalstar and fellow incumbents like Ligado and Iridium could be the next to stare down a DOSE audit. SpaceX’s Playbook: Just Rewrite the Rules SpaceX isn’t really accusing EchoStar of breaking the rules. It’s saying the rules themselves are broken if legacy benchmarks and compliance metrics amount to little more than performative box-checking. Enter DOSE: a data-driven pretext for broader reform. Sound familiar? DOSE is shaping up to be just what the FCC needs to justify revising the 2 GHz and/or Big LEO licensing framework to enable shared spectrum use prioritized for next-gen NGSO (read: Starlink) systems. Should the Commission agree, it will erode legacy operators’ grip on certain bands and fundamentally shift the balance of spectrum power. This regulatory recalibration is not just about the players, though. It’s about the game. And how SpaceX is nudging the FCC to change the rules in a time when satellites don’t just provide connectivity, they apparently police it. If compliance shifts from paperwork to prove it, then we are ushering in the beginning of a regulatory Hunger Games. And in this arena? The odds feel ever in SpaceX’s favor.   1.       The PSD data in SpaceX’s April 14 filing was collected in Q4 2024, prior to the launch of its v2 Mini Optimized satellites in March 2025 , suggesting the use of its Direct to Cell satellites.

May 21, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry No satellite operator has transformed the status quo quite like SpaceX. When the company began launching the Starlink constellation in 2019, there were roughly 2,000 satellites in space from all of humanity  – every country, company, university and laboratory combined. SpaceX is now launching around 2,000 Starlink satellites every 12 months, and may exceed that rate in 2025. Looking back at the 8,000 Starlink satellites SpaceX has launched (inclusive of one failure) provides a means of analyzing the pace of Starlink’s deployment. Per Quilty research, after the first 2,000 Starlinks – which were slower to launch due to teething production challenges and the covid-19 pandemic – SpaceX has added 1,000 new satellites roughly every six months. The company has maintained this deployment rate even while introducing newer, larger satellite iterations that resulted in fewer spacecraft fitting on each Falcon 9 rocket. While the number of satellites trended down (from 60 initially to 22), SpaceX’s overall launch rate kept increasing. SpaceX’s dramatic increase in launch cadence enabled the company to start deploying a second LEO constellation – the Starlink Direct-to-Cell constellation – with minimal impact on the core broadband fleet. SpaceX began regular launches of Starlink DTC satellites 12 months ago in May 2024, and has averaged slightly under 300 DTC satellites launched alongside every 1,000 broadband satellites. SpaceX’s introduction of DTC modestly slowed broadband deployment – it took eight months to launch 1,000 broadband satellites from March to November 2024, the longest in more than two years – but the company is once again accelerating its launch rate. Introduced in 2024, the “Optimized” V2 Mini reduced mass 22%, enabling 29 broadband satellites per rocket versus 23 previously. By early 2025, SpaceX began conducting more Falcon 9 launches solely with the V2 Mini Optimized. The optimized V2 Mini will likely be the last generation of satellites to fly on the Falcon 9 before SpaceX shifts over to the V3 satellite, which was designed to launch on Starship. But even without Starship, SpaceX has proven that it can launch a world’s worth of satellites in a single year, with room to spare. Source: https://spaceflightnow.com/2025/05/16/live-coverage-spacex-plans-morning-launch-of-starlink-satellites-from-california/

May 30, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry Ever since its unveiling in 2022 , the EU’s Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²) constellation has been a roller coaster of ups and downs. Initially belittled as an underwhelming “me too” project, IRIS² gained purpose after Russia invaded Ukraine and Musk’s antics made Europe uncomfortable relying so heavily on Starlink to connect soldiers on the battlefield. Then the costs came in. Initially estimated at €6 billion , the program ballooned to €10.6 billion while still in the ideation phase. Delays also quickly ramped, as the in-service date slipped from an (overly) optimistic 2024 , to 2026, to 2028, to 2030, and now potentially 2031. Meanwhile, the full constellation of 290 satellites across MEO and LEO is expected to produce only 3.3 terabits per second of capacity , of which  2 Tbps will come from LEO . The LEO portion is the equivalent of two ViaSat-3 satellites in GEO or two Starlink V3 satellites in LEO – but for a multiple of the cost. And while there’s more to a good constellation than raw capacity, the numbers are thoroughly underwhelming. Telesat Lightspeed will have an estimated 10 Tbps  – five times as much as IRIS² from less than 200 satellites. Increasingly costly, bloated, and delayed before the first satellite is even launched, IRIS² is at risk of losing government and industrial support. This begs the question, why is IRIS² in so much trouble? Quilty Space has identified the following reasons: 1.      Too many competing interests. IRIS² is supposed to have service in Ka-band, military Ka-band, Ku-band, and maybe UHF, with “hardgov,” “lightgov,” and commercial service across two different orbits, possibly with hosted payloads. User terminals are supposed to be multi-purpose, multi-waveform, multi-orbit, and phased array. This is a long list of requirements that adds complexity to the satellite design and huge complexity to the ground, slowing the program while driving up costs. 2.      Confused identity relative to Starlink. IRIS² got purpose as a sovereign replacement to Starlink, but the constellation is considerably smaller, its user terminals are poised to be much more expensive, and its launch requirements are too small to generate a flywheel effect like the symbiosis between Starlink and the SpaceX Falcon 9. Europe already has military communications satellites – Sicral in Italy, Syracuse in France, SATCOMBw in Germany, Spainsat in France, and Govsat-1 in Luxembourg, plus the OneWeb LEO constellation. Europe doesn’t need another satcom network, it needs a better one, but it is unclear IRIS² will be that. 3.      Active fault lines.  Despite being a pan-European program, Italy and Germany have already intimated they want national constellations of their own. The French government is a partial owner of the OneWeb constellation through Eutelsat, as is the British government even though the latter isn’t part of the EU. The large number of national interests complicates IRIS² and slows the program down relative to constellations with single owners. 4.      Industrial support.  Although established as a public-private partnership, the government partners (the European Commission and ESA) were unable to secure the desired private contribution because Airbus and Thales Alenia Space bowed out, leaving SES, Eutelsat and Hispasat to hold the bag. Both SES and Eutelsat are stretched financially and operationally due to recent acquisitions, while Hispasat is being acquired by the Indra Group. Over the past 3-4 years, the IRIS² program has cast a long shadow on the European space industry, which is eager for the work but weary of the premise. As progress and momentum have built, IRIS² has become a freight train, pulling the industry in a singular direction. But the industry-led SpaceRise consortium and the European Commission both preserve the right to scrap the current approach if deemed unfeasible. As key supplier data comes in this year and potentially in early 2026, the question is, will they? Source: https://www.spaceintelreport.com/europes-iris2-organization-contractor-selection-likely-cost-and-schedule-are-now-openly-questioned/

June 12, 2025 - Written by Caleb Henry A Quilty Space chart showing awardees in Nevada’s BEAD program prior to the June 6 program rewrite. On June 6, NTIA issued a drastic overhaul  of the $42.5 billion BEAD program to include policy priorities of the Trump administration, including, among other things, a technology-neutral approach that puts LEO satellite broadband on a more equal footing with fiber. Historically, U.S. government broadband programs have skewed heavily in favor of fiber, even in remote locations where satellite technology excels.  BEAD, prior to the rewrite, was trending in a similar direction. Of the three states that had finalized their BEAD plans, only two included satellite connectivity in their solutions for connecting unserved and underserved communities. Although Trump rescinded those state plans , they can provide useful case studies for how BEAD was unfolding. Delaware planned  to spend more than $107M connecting 5,721 households and businesses, a cost equaling $18,700 per site. Contrast that with a residential Starlink plan, where the same amount of money could furnish a house with a terminal and fund connectivity (at $120 a month) for more than 12 years. Louisiana’s plan  allocated 95% of BEAD locations to fiber, even while saying it “firmly believe[s] in the technology advancements and innovative evolution of fixed wireless and LEO providers.” Nevada preliminarily awarded Amazon Kuiper $14.5M to connect 4,891 locations, a cost equal to approximately $3,000 per site. Of the 19 companies that won BEAD deals in Nevada, Amazon Kuiper was the third cheapest. The most expensive fiber company, Beehive Broadband, averages $77,000 per site. The vast majority of Nevada’s BEAD awards  still went to fiber. Kuiper accounted for 2.6% of the state’s $553.8M spending plan. Prior to the NTIA rewrite, BEAD in some cases   explicitly prioritized  the use of fiber. And while there are definitely cases where fiber is the superior solution – like connecting apartment complexes – the overwhelming number of awards went to fiber providers, often at cost points multiple times that of satellite connectivity, providing an indication of how BEAD was likely to play out. Elimination of BEAD policies that favored fiber for “priority broadband projects” presents an opportunity for Amazon Kuiper and SpaceX’s Starlink to compete more aggressively for awards. NTIA’s rewrite maintained the requirement for 100 milliseconds or less of latency, which precludes GEO operators Hughes and Viasat from participating. For LEO satellite operators, the stakes for BEAD are high. Just 5% of the $42.5 billion would equal an amount greater than what the Canadian government is loaning Telesat  to help finance the Lightspeed enterprise broadband constellation. An entire LEO constellation could be bankrolled by a fraction of the proposed BEAD funding. Source: https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2025/06/09/ntia-policy-changes-open-door-to-satellite-in-bead-program/

10/15/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry On Oct. 11, SpaceX filed with the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requesting to modify Starlink’s architecture and establish what it calls “SpaceX V3.” The filing pertains to SpaceX’s plans for a 30,000-satellite constellation (specifically, 29,988 satellites), of which the FCC has authorized an initial 7,500 satellites. The filing showcases the incredible speed at which Starlink has moved, having launched nearly 3,000 Gen-2 satellites in less than two years. It also showcases a bit of Starlink's competitive thinking and geopolitical posturing. SpaceX is urging the FCC to approve the new architecture to “remain globally competitive amidst the rise of state-owned and state-backed satellite systems that have been deploying at a rapid clip.” This is most likely a reference to Chinese constellations like Spacesail, GuoWang, and Honghu-3, each of which aims to have more than 10,000 satellites. SpaceX requested several changes, with the end goal of delivering “gigabit” speeds to end users (apparently to consumers, not just higher-paying enterprise and mobility customers) and improving coverage of high-demand areas. The following short analysis examines four key changes that Starlink is requesting now and in recent filings, along with their implications as understood at this time. Key modifications: A potentially dramatic increase in spectrum use. Today, Starlink mainly uses Ku-band for customer-facing services and Ka-band for gateway links. Starlink's modification discusses using Ku-, Ka-, V-, and E-band “for either mobile- or fixed-satellite use cases” where regulations and technology allow. Implication: Starlink may need user terminals in these new bands, not just Ku-band or multi-band terminals. The latter is a rarity today, not that unfamiliarity has ever stopped SpaceX before, in launch or in broadband hardware. A drop in orbital altitude. SpaceX wants to lower its three orbital shells by 45 to 60 kilometers each, shifting from the current 525-km, 530-km, and 535-km shells to 480-km, 485-km, and 475-km altitudes, respectively. Implication: The change would reduce Starlink’s latency slightly, improve de-orbit times slightly, and provide other benefits. SpaceX says the reconfiguration will enable it to “deliver better broadband coverage and service quality for American consumers in areas of high demand” and be more responsive to consumer demand changes. Notably, the change would also give Starlink more wiggle room since the FCC sided with Amazon in requiring a minimum separation distance, meaning Starlink satellites aren’t allowed to go above 580 kilometers (Kuiper begins at 590 kilometers). Lower elevation angle by five degrees. Starlink wants user terminals to scan down to 20 degrees above the horizon (versus 25 today) after the altitude drop. This makes sense because satellites at lower altitudes will zip across the sky even faster, so widening the aperture gives more time for connections. Implication: Not only would a wider scan range offset the lower orbits, but it should (per SpaceX) increase data rates by increasing the number of satellites in simultaneous view at any given time. It's worth noting, however, that this won’t always be possible. The closer the elevation angle gets to the horizon, the greater the likelihood of blockages from structures like buildings, trees and mountains. A change in orbital inclination. By shifting the inclination of future launches by one to five degrees, SpaceX says it can better launch future satellites on Starship from Boca Chica, Texas. Implication: In the past, SpaceX had outlined two different LEO architectures, one based more heavily on Falcon 9 launches, the other more heavily reliant on Starship. The new paperwork suggests Starship is taking a firmer role in Starlink’s go-forward plans. It's worth noting that FCC filings give a window into a company’s future vision but are not a guarantee of near-term actions or actions at all (the FCC’s dockets are filled with V-band constellations that have remained nothing but paper, for example). Therefore, the above conclusions should be taken with a healthy grain of salt. SOURCE: https://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/swr031b.hts?q_set=V_SITE_ANTENNA_FREQ.file_numberC/File+Number/%3D/SATMOD2024101100224&prepare=&column=V_SITE_ANTENNA_FREQ.file_numberC/File+Number

10/9/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry The Defense Department doles out study contracts in the six-to-seven figure range so often they are rarely worth mentioning in the grand scheme of needle movers, but the Space Development Agency’s Commercial Disposal Services awards are different. On September 26, the agency split $1.9 million in study contracts across six U.S. companies – Arkisys, Impulse Space, Quantum Space, Sierra Space, SpaceWorks Enterprises, and Starfish Space – to evaluate on-demand “de-orbit as a service” for the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) constellation. Megaconstellations have long been thought of as ideal customers for debris-removal services on account of their large numbers of spacecraft, the high value of their orbits, and the likelihood of spacecraft failures that could compromise those orbits. But the largest of these constellations – Starlink – has been extremely proactive in taking steps that avoid requiring such services. Its satellites are deployed around 250 kilometers above sea level, meaning premature failures are quickly swept up by Earth’s atmosphere. Starlink doesn’t always operate satellites through their full design life, instead piloting them downward for destructive reentries while the company still has them under control. And should a Starlink satellite die in service, its operational orbit of 550 kilometers is low enough that gravity and residual atmospheric drag will pull the satellite down within four years . The PWSA constellation, in contrast, operates at 1,000 kilometers. Satellites that fail at that higher altitude will remain stuck for millennia. For SDA, having a debris-removal service isn’t really optional. Effective space stewardship requires a means to preserve the PWSA orbit, especially in the case of contingencies like unexpected satellite failures. SDA’s effort to cultivate American debris removal companies could also benefit other constellations. Another 200 kilometers above PWSA is where Eutelsat operates the 600-plus-satellite OneWeb constellation (1,200km orbit), and a farther 100km is where Telesat plans to fly 200 Lightspeed broadband satellites (1,300km orbit) . The SDA effort could also cultivate competitors for international debris-removal companies. While SDA, in its justification for the study contracts, said “no such product or service yet exists” to support commercial on-orbit servicing, like “assisted disposal operations,” startups Astroscale of Japan, ClearSpace of Switzerland, and D-Orbit of Italy have been maturing technologies for this very purpose. SOURCE: https://www.sda.mil/sda-makes-commercial-disposal-services-study-awards-under-stec-baa/

10/4/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Military agencies have long been ideal customers for the satellite industry because of their willingness to pay a premium for resilient communications. This year, and in particular this past month, Quilty Space has noticed an uptick in the use of the term PACE – short for Primary, Alternative, Contingency and Emergency – four ways to ensure connectivity in challenging areas. PACE can include multiple orbits (LEO, MEO, GEO), multiple frequencies (Ka-, Ku-, L-band) and even multiple types of connectivity (satcom, LTE, Link-16). As a concept, PACE has been around for at least a decade, so why the change? The answer is Starlink. To compete with the SpaceX megaconstellation, companies are increasingly turning to the PACE approach as an important differentiator, particularly on the user terminal. Such was the case on Gogo’s Sept. 30 conference call to discuss its $375M+ merger with Satcom Direct. Gogo management described the combined company as “uniquely positioned to win contracts under PACE,” because it can combine LEO (OneWeb), GEO (Intelsat), L-band (Viasat/Iridium) and ATG connectivity to keep military aircraft connected. Starlink user terminals, according to Gogo, lack modems capable of switching between these options. Furthermore, Starlink would likely need to increase the number of antenna elements inside its user terminal to close links to GEO satellites, making the overall terminal larger. Satcom Direct was one of 20 companies that won contracts under the Defense Information Systems Agency’s $900M proliferated LEO IDIQ last year . Since then, IDIQ awardees have increasingly touted their PACE capabilities, including Honeywell , Hughes , Iridium, OneWeb Technologies , SES (DRS Global Enterprise Solutions), and Viasat. Participants in DoD’s Defense Experimentation Using Commercial Space Internet (DEUCSI) program have done the same. Will PACE offer protection to satellite operators competing against Starlink? To an extent, yes. There’s nothing stopping Starlink, which is also on the IDIQ, from creating its own PACE-capable offering, but the company would have to partner with other satellite and/or telecommunications companies to provide such a resilient service. Given the number of customers Starlink has poached in other verticals like consumer broadband, aviation and maritime, industry players are ramping efforts in a corner of the market where the winner can’t take all (not that this means the winner can’t still take most). Source: https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/about-us/blogs/keeping-pace-with-military-connectivity-needs

9/26/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Every year at the perennial Paris pilgrimage, one or more trends emerge as the dominant theme of the show, and 2024 was no different. Quilty Space attended the weeklong conference, meeting with dozens of companies in satcom, remote sensing, and space hardware sectors. DTD was the dominant theme last year and Starlink’s entry into enterprise market was the talk of the show in 2022. What were our top themes from this year’s show? Key Takeaways: Starlink & Kuiper leave nowhere to hide. In the face of emerging LEO threats, incumbent GEO operators for years pointed to enterprise and mobility as safe havens. That's no longer the case. Starlink’s ability to vacuum up prized customers in 2024 – John Deere for IoT, Carnival Corp for cruise ships, and just a week ago United Airlines for 1,000 aircraft – sent shivers through the industry. Plus, now that Kuiper is on the verge of its massive launch campaign, the satellite broadband business increasingly looks like a battle of titans, with the traditional players caught in the middle. Conversations around differentiated offerings and diversification strategies were abundant. DTD is still hot (on the down low).  How do you top 2023’s declaration of a new $100B industry?  While there weren’t any splashy new announcements at this year’s show, there was a heavy undercurrent of activity at the manufacturing level where vendors claimed multiple bid opportunities. Propulsion is a growing headache. The loss of market access to Russian supplier Fakel, the emergence of a high-demand customer (SDA), and a slew of propulsion failures continues to put pressure on satellite manufacturers to find new, reliable sources of thrusters. Some companies are planning to vertically integrate propulsion, while others ( like Safran ) are standing up whole new factories to meet demand. Among components manufacturers are hard-pressed to obtain, propulsion is arguably one of their biggest pain points. Software-defined satellite costs are on the rise. Once perceived as the GEO industry’s answer to the LEO onslaught, software-defined satellites have fallen years behind schedule and surged in price, with one manufacturer’s cost reportedly doubling its price in just 12 months. It's no secret that Airbus and Thales Alenia Space have been hurting as they absorb satcom-induced losses in their space businesses. That is creating opportunities for U.S. GEO manufacturers that all but disappeared from the market in the years following the covid pandemic. It also adds fuel to the fire of the big vs. small GEO debate. Smallsat manufacturing hopefuls are proliferating. The industry itself is confused by the seemingly endless stream of new entrants creating factories for small satellite constellations. This year saw expanded factories for companies that already have customers, notably MDA Space for Telesat Lightspeed, Terran Orbital /Lockheed for the military’s PWSA constellation, and vertically integrated Amazon Kuiper. At the same time, startups Apex Space, Aerospacelab and Orbitworks (the Loft Orbital/Marlan Space UAE JV) are standing up new factories. Industry patrons are generally impressed by the caliber of new entrants, but year after year the number of factory announcements outpaces the number of new constellations. Launcher competition is sorely wanted. Notwithstanding SpaceX’s remarkable 2-week turnaround after its first failure in years, the industry has a strong desire for multiple regular and reliable launch providers. Launch providers are acutely aware of this (and have been for years). The question now as new vehicles reach their respective launch pads is: can they execute? A successful first flight is one thing, but reaching a steady cadence is another animal. SOURCE: https://wsbw.com/

9/5/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Supply chain fragility has been a perpetual challenge for the satellite industry, often centering on subsystems and components for which there are very few suppliers. This fragility was on full display during the Covid-19 crisis (e.g., two-year satellite manufacturing delays), but flare-ups continue to surface four years after the crisis peaked. In the case of satellite propulsion, the supplier landscape was the opposite. Quilty Space counts more than 100 different thruster systems marketed over the past five years by more than 80 companies, ranging from international defense primes to small-town shops, to the Cambrian explosion of venture-funded startups that emerged in the mid-2010s. Despite the market’s apparent oversupply, however, the Space Development Agency (SDA), Payload reports, could encounter delays with its PWSA constellation of several hundred satellites due to the slow delivery of propulsion units. What went wrong? As it turns out, electric propulsion (EP) thrusters, especially the Hall-Effect thrusters pLEO operators fancy, are extremely hard to manufacture at scale. Russia-based EDB Fakel was historically the industry’s largest producer of EP thrusters (by an order of magnitude) but has been barred from Western supply chains since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Fakel’s exit from the market prompted OneWeb to source its thrusters from its backup supplier, Massachusetts-based Busek, which is now the only U.S. company to have built more than 100 Hall-Effect thrusters. Meanwhile, dozens of EP vendors have been unable to fill the gap. In the past two years alone, at least four EP vendors have experienced in-orbit anomalies, including Bradford, Enpulsion, Qinetiq, and Phase Four. And while a handful of U.S. companies have developed Hall-Effect thrusters of their own (or licensed the IP), all but Busek are still attempting to scale production nearly a decade later. What are SDA’s options for maintaining its targeted two-year cadence of satellite launches? Possibilities include: · Tapping into vertically integrated constellation operators like SpaceX or Amazon · Invest in promising EP vendors to help them scale · Switch to alternative propulsion technologies such as gridded ion or electrospray · Working with suppliers in allied countries It’s an overstated adage, but space is hard, and when that difficulty is buried in the supply chain it can introduce setbacks for multi-billion-dollar programs. While everyone is focused on the high-profile launch battles, there won’t be many satellites to launch if no one can build propulsion units at scale. SOURCE: https://payloadspace.com/there-arent-enough-satellite-thrusters-for-the-sda-yet/

8/30/2024 - Written By Quilty Space Over the past two years, Starlink has hit the maritime industry like a tsunami, swallowing up cruise line, yachts, and merchant vessels at such high rates that competitors must adapt or die. When it comes to aviation, however, Starlink hasn’t quite taken flight with the same ease. Via Satellite , in interviews with four different airlines that all evaluated Starlink, found a surprisingly tepid response to the service. None went with Starlink, instead choosing other providers like Viasat, Anuvu, and Intelsat/OneWeb. This begs the question, why isn’t Starlink dominating the skies the way it is the seas? Between these interviews and the experiences of other inflight connectivity service providers, three reasons emerge: 1. 1. Starlink’s IFC antennas aren't making the cut. Multiple airlines spoke of a desire for better electronically steered antennas, and the emergence of Starlink hasn’t scratched that itch. According to Gogo CEO Oakleigh Thorne, Starlink’s aviation antennas are essentially repurposed consumer antennas, which struggle to endure the extreme conditions of the airborne environment. 2. 2. No airline passenger access. According to AeroMexico, Starlink wi-fi connects passengers straight to the internet without giving airlines a landing page or other means to interact with their customers. Airlines don’t like that, as it limits touch points for selling other goods and services. 3. 3. Non-committal data rates. For certain industries like oil & gas, defense, and aviation, satellite uptime is way more important than peak data rates. To date, Starlink has proven unwilling or unable to offer Service Level Agreements (SLA) or Committed Information Rates (CIRs) demanded by premium satcom users. Of course, that doesn’t mean all airlines have turned their backs on Starlink; Hawaiian Airlines, Japan's Zipair, airBaltic in Latvia, and Qatar Airways all use the service . But room exists, largely of Starlink’s own making, for other IFC service providers to hold their own. SOURCE: https://interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/september-2024/4-airlines-share-their-perspectives-on-the-ifc-market/

8/21/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry During the heyday of the 2020-2022 SPAC investment bubble, more than a dozen space companies filed to go public, ranging from established players like Planet and Spire to early-stage, pre-revenue startups. Another half dozen space companies rode the same investment wave to a more traditional IPO. The surge in exit activity was a boon for VCs and early-stage investors, some of which were holding long-dated investments with lofty private market valuations. The SPAC vortex welcomed all comers. But not all comers deserved to be public, and many have come to regret their decision. Fabien Jordan, the CEO of the Swiss Internet-of-Things company, Astrocast, framed the issue perfectly in an August 20 LinkedIn post , after his company delisted from the Euronext Growth Exchange almost three years to the date from when it went public . “From a business maturity standpoint, it was too early to list the company as we were still in a pre-revenue phase, but it provided access to sorely needed capital,” he wrote. “Once the initial excitement of the public listing wore off in 2022, being public made it more difficult to access fresh capital.” And the body count is growing. Astra, the flashy small launch provider that went public in July 2021 with a $2.1B valuation, delisted last month. That follows Virgin Orbit’s $3.7B flameout after 15 months as a public company. And just yesterday, German optical crosslink manufacturer Mynaric slashed its midpoint 2024 revenue guidance by 70%, raising liquidity concerns. Another half dozen space companies that went public since 2020 are trading at market capitalizations below $200M – most with diminishing cash reserves.  The moral of the story? Funding space startups, which are notoriously capital intensive with long development cycles, is a tricky business. And the consequences of choosing the wrong path can be fatal. On that point, it’s worth noting that two companies that cancelled their SPAC transactions in 2022, D-Orbit and Tomorrow.io, were subsequently able to raise a collective $194M via late-stage VC rounds. SOURCE: https://x.com/strocast/status/1825980942059528312

8/14/2024 - Written By Chris Quilty It’s been a pretty miserable decade if you’re a GEO operator. The spectrum skirmishes over Ku and Ka-bands kicked things off, followed by a relentless arms race to launch increasingly more powerful HTS satellites. Meanwhile, consumers started cutting the cord, and the video cash cow tipped into decline beginning in the late 2010s. But the real blow came from Starlink’s efforts to decimate the GEO industry, particularly in the maritime sector, where LEO is anchoring itself as the dominant technology. KVH Industries, a top-five maritime bandwidth seller, has shuttered its GEO antenna product line and is now onboarding ~600 new Starlink subscribers each quarter — compared to just ~600 GEO subscribers annually in the past. With that context, Eutelsat’s Q4 earnings report was a breath of fresh air. Eutelsat grew annual revenues for the first time in eight years, and backlog is up for the first time in four years. The catalyst for the turnaround? Aside from new GEO capacity, the biggest growth driver was OneWeb. While Eutelsat does not disclose OneWeb revenues, we estimate OneWeb FY24 revenues at ~€80M, or 7% of revenues. That’s a disappointment relative to Eutelsat’s revised July 2023 target of €125-€225M, due to delays in deploying the ground network that have pushed back OneWeb’s global service launch by eight months to date. This delay will prevent OneWeb from hitting its 2027 revenue target of >€600M, but even achieving half of that would account for 21% (1) of Eutelsat’s revenues and contribute to rapidly expanding EBITDA margins. The takeaway? Eutelsat faced plenty of skepticism over its OneWeb acquisition, but it’s clear now that OneWeb represents the company’s most compelling growth opportunity. As it turns out, there is life after GEO for operators bold enough to bet big on a hybrid network strategy. 1. 1. Assumes legacy GEO business remains flat. SOURCE: https://www.eutelsat.com/files/EC_consolidated_financial_statements_FY24_vDEF_en.pdf

8/7/2024 - Written By Chris Quilty If the GEO satcom industry is to survive, GEO satellite manufacturers will need to up their game and reverse a troubling trend of ever-longer time to bring new GEO capacity online. Starlink progressed through four generations of satellites in the time it took Viasat to bring its first ViaSat-3 online (8.5 years).  Prior to the adoption of high-throughput satellite (HTS) technology, the standard build time for a GEO satcom satellite was three years, and post-launch, a satellite could be brought into operation in as little as two weeks. As communications satellites have grown increasingly complex, however, manufacturing build times have grown by at least two years. Meanwhile, the time to calibrate and bring satellites into service is also growing. Viasat’s announcement that ViaSat-3 is now operational 15 months after launch is an extreme example (exacerbated by an antenna failure), but the trend has been steadily up and to the right over the past decade, growing by about half a year even when factoring in electric orbit raising.  A Quilty Space survey of the highest capacity GEO satellites launched in recent years shows that ViaSat-3 F1 is now the second Very High-Throughput Satellite (VHTS) stuck in calibration limbo for more than a year, following Eutelsat’s Konnect VHTS, which took ~14 months from launch to service. Not every VHTS satellite is experiencing the same challenges. EchoStar’s Jupiter-3 went from launch to service in about five months, and SES activated the SES-17 satellite’s service in eight months. These, too, were novel satellite designs, but the two satellites averaged 5.5 years from order to service start. Unfortunately, the outlook isn’t particularly encouraging. With Boeing in shambles, Maxar owned by private equity, and Lockheed safely in its DoD shell, Northrop looks like the one-eyed giant in the land of the blind. But do they want to take a hard swing at the commercial GEO satcom market?  The prospects over the pond are not much better. Both Airbus and Thales Alenia Space are struggling with new software-defined satellite programs that are two to four years behind schedule and a financial disaster for both companies. Rumors of merger talks are probably not wrong. Perhaps the future lies elsewhere? That would be the thesis behind a new generation of GEO competitors, ranging from small GEOs (Swissto12) to monster GEOs that can only launch on Starship (K2 Space). All bets are on. SOURCE: https://news.viasat.com/newsroom/viasat-3-f1-satellite-enters-commercial-service

7/30/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry inside 30 hours .

7/23/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry The Space Development Agency (SDA) has dozens of satellites in space and hundreds in production as part of its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) proliferated LEO constellation, having organized an impressive team of (largely commercial) manufacturing partners. However, as the agency plans to operationalize the PWSA, there’s been a notable lack of news about user terminals (i.e., antennas and modems) for the connectivity portion of the constellation. PWSA has two layers of satellites, a Tracking Layer for monitoring missiles and hypersonic weapons, and a Transport Layer for communications services. SDA graphics indicate the PWSA will have three communications payloads: -          Link-16 to expand tactical communications for soldiers beyond line of sight -          Ka-band for “direct downlinks to theater-targeting cells,” and -          Optical links mainly for in-space communications, but also for drones. The first set, Link-16, is designed to stitch seamlessly into existing networks, creating little if any need for new user equipment. Optical crosslinks are in a period of aggressive development, thanks overwhelmingly to SDA to creating opportunities of scale. High-speed connections through Ka-band, however, will only be achievable if new user terminals are available for soldiers and vehicles. In particular, SDA should seek to cultivate a suite of Ka-band user terminals, which will need to be flat, electronically steered antennas. User terminals take years to develop, and can even take longer than satellites given the complexity of the electronics systems. Commercial Ka-band megaconstellations are on the way but have not yet flooded the market with user terminals. Amazon Kuiper terminals aren’t ready for purchase. Telesat Lightspeed is still in development. Most available flat-panel antennas are in Ku-band and aren’t compatible with the PWSA constellation, such as Starlink’s dishy, or OneWeb user terminals from Intellian, Hughes and others. While satellite development started first, SDA can play catch up by partnering with companies making flat-panel antennas for commercial constellations. Quilty Space would not be surprised to see mil-Ka variants of user terminals for Amazon Kuiper or Telesat Lightspeed. Manufacturers of Ku-band antennas could also be incentivized to make Ka-band versions that work with the PWSA constellation. If SDA only cultivates satellite manufacturers and not user terminal companies, it will waste billions of dollars and years of time playing catchup. That’s not a situation anyone wants, except perhaps America’s adversaries. SOURCE: https://spacenews.com/space-force-preparing-for-the-age-of-proliferated-low-earth-orbit-satellite-networks/

7/22/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Press leaks on M&A discussions typically aren’t helpful (remember EchoStar’s attempt at buying Inmarsat? ), but there was probably no good way to hide the fact that Airbus and Thales Alenia Space (TAS) are in early discussions about a potential merger of their space businesses. Both companies’ satellite manufacturing business have been underwater from signing deals for unexpectedly difficult-to-build nextgen satellites. Both companies are also grappling with a ~50% decline in the demand for commercial GEO satellites (the traditional lifeblood of the industry). A tie-up between Europe's two largest space companies would recast the competitive dynamic internally within Europe and externally between Europe and the rest of the world. While it’s too early to say whether the merger will happen, Quilty Space considers the following possibilities if the talks prove true. Pros: A buffer against a turbulent market. Airbus and TAS are Europe’s two largest space companies by pretty much any metric, and while both have won high-profile international deals, they have struggled to deal with market shifts. Single-digit GEO satellite orders are now the norm, and LEO constellation orders are rare and highly competitive. A combined company could fare better than two fighting over a lumpier, less predictable customer set. Scale and consolidation. Each company brings unique capabilities to the merger (e.g., Airbus’ EO business), but there remains a significant amount of overlap. Airbus and TAS have space facilities spread across much of Western Europe. Both have sites in the UK, France, Spain, Italy and Germany. Some of these sites are undoubtedly to meet the European Space Agency’s geo-return policy, giving each company access to more funding but at the cost of a bloated footprint. This presents a meaningful opportunity for consolidation and related cost savings. Cons: Loss of domestic competition . Absent the success of small to medium enterprises, Europe’s space landscape would lose its most significant continental competitive dynamic. Airbus+TAS against the world could be stronger together, but will Airbus+TAS lose pricing power with only one provider of national satellite programs? If the past serves as prologue, the formation of ULA from the combination of Boeing and Lockheed’s launch businesses in 2005 led to a “Nunn-McCurdy certification” breach within six years when the cost of military launches rose 58% above the 2007 baseline. No near-term relief . An apparent motive for the Airbus-TAS merger talks is both companies trying to offset cost overruns, particularly software-defined satellites (OneSat at Airbus, Inspire at Thales). Nowhere has it been clarified how a merger would resolve the engineering dilemmas that are creating those cost overruns. Is this a short-term solution to a long-term problem? TBD: While a combined Airbus-TAS Space would be a formidable competitor, the tie-up could make room for smaller but growing players like Aerospacelab in Belgium, OHB in Germany, and Sitael in Italy. The European Space Agency and other institutional customers will want to see more competition. Absent a choice between titans, would ESA throw more capital to emerging companies? Not all of Airbus and TAS’s space capabilities overlap. How would a merger consider Airbus’ expertise in launch via ArianeGroup, or TAS’s strength in building space station and cargo modules? SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airbus-looking-opportunities-create-scale-space-satellites-2024-07-21/

7/17/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry In June, Earth Observation (EO) company Planet announced a 17% workforce reduction, shedding around 180 employees in the company’s second round of layoffs in just over a year. This news, combined with M arch and June layoffs from Satellogic, has pushed the EO industry into a fresh season of soul-searching.   The not-so-subtle undercurrent driving these layoffs and broader U.S. EO sector behavior over the past three years is that commercial adoption of satellite imagery hasn’t materialized as envisioned. Nowhere was this felt more acutely than at Planet, which boasted the industry’s highest commercial exposure (49% of FY22 revenues) and an espoused goal of growing its commercial sales.  Flush with a $590 million war chest from going public in 2021, Planet staffed up aggressively to capture a market it estimated was worth $75 billion by 2027 .  From 2021 to 2023, Planet added 380 employees (up 48%), far more than BlackSky, Maxar and Satellogic combined. When commercial sales proved slower and smaller than anticipated, Planet was more exposed than its peers.   Satellogic faced a similar challenge, but with an incomplete constellation, nil revenues, and a heavy capex lift, the challenge proved even more intractable. Satellogic’s headcount is down 16% since 2021.   Maxar’s Earth Intelligence headcount is flat relative to 2021, with a 7% fluctuation in the middle years due to changes that had more to do with new private equity ownership in 2023 than the EO market.   Only BlackSky has managed to increase its headcount without a subsequent market or ownership-induced culling. Located in Herndon, VA, just outside of Washington, BlackSky’s market is almost entirely defense and intelligence (D&I), and the company grew its workforce by 33% (~70 employees) based on growth in that market, not the commercial sector.   What can we learn about the state of EO from the hiring and layoff activity over the past several years? The clearest message is that the commercial market for EO remains underwhelming, especially relative to SPAC presentation forecasts. Were EO companies wrong about the commercial market opportunity, or will the commercial market bloom once the industry achieves the right combination of resolution, revisit, price, and analytics?   Regardless, the near-term result is an increased dependency on the U.S. government as the anchor customer. Planet is now headed in this direction, with management indicating on the company’s June 6 earnings call that near-term growth will come from the government. For BlackSky and, to a lesser extent, Maxar, this has already long been the case. Satellogic is headed in the same direction, having begun redomiciling in the U.S. to address the D&I market. We expect future hiring to moderate now that post-SPAC exuberance has worn off and pragmatism has become the norm. SOURCE: https://www.satellitetoday.com/people/2024/06/28/planet-to-lay-off-17-of-its-workforce/

7/1/2024 - Written By Chris Quilty Last week, Airbus announced it was taking a €900 million charge in its Space Systems business. This follows a €600M hit just four months before. What’s going on? Airbus builds three types of satellites: comms, navigation, and EO. While the three product lines are all having problems, comms is its cornerstone – specifically, the OneSat software-defined satellite program. The trend toward a more adaptable, reconfigurable, flexible platform like OneSat marks a strategic pivot in the sector as traditional GEOs get boxed out by Starlink. And, just last year, Viasat, the chief pioneer and advocate of multi-Tbps GEO satellites, canceled its Viasat-4 program. So, is it any wonder that software-defined is looking like GEO's new lifeline? The problem is that software-defined satellites are still just mostly vapor. Sure, Boeing managed to develop a software-defined payload funded by the DoD through the WGS program. But Maxar was too broke to bankroll one. Lockheed is overly focused on government missions and has retreated from the commercial market. Orbital Sciences was acquired by Northrop, and we don’t know what happened there. Shifting to the win column: in 2015, the European Space Agency (ESA) and French space agency Centre National d'Études Spatiales (CNES) awarded Airbus (OneSat) and Thales Alenia Space (Space Inspire) a collective €227M through the ARTES program. The funds were to support their payload development efforts, with the goal of reducing satellite manufacturing costs by 30% while maintaining Europe’s commercial market share. This was a significant boost for Airbus and Thales Alenia Space, and things were looking up. ESA & CNES targeted 2019 for the first launch.  After a slow start, Airbus eventually landed the first software-defined satellite order in 2019 (a three-satellite order from Inmarsat). A flurry of orders followed for both manufacturers. Between 2018 and 2022, software-defined satellites from Airbus and TAS swept up 11 of the 23 commercially competed satellite orders* — an impressive 47% win rate. But while ESA & CNES hit their market share goals, the 30% cost reduction target, and promise of quick delivery times have proven more elusive. The OneSat program is now shaping up to be a billion-euro albatross for Airbus, and TAS is also showing signs of distress after announcing a 15% layoff for the space division in March. More troubling for the industry, the order-to-orbit time for Airbus is now pushing to nine years or triple the average three-year delivery time of a production GEO model (note: before its most recent delay, Viasat was projecting a 2027 service entry for its first-in-line GX 7 satellite).  But Viasat isn’t the only operator feeling the pain from software-defined satellite delays. In total, eight satellite operators have placed OneSat and Space Inspire orders with Airbus and TAS, including: 1. Intelsat. Ordered two (2) OneSats and two (2) Space Inspires. This new capacity is desperately needed to woo IFC customers. 2. Viasat. Three (3) Inmarsat F-7’s represent the company’s nextgen GX broadband service, replacing the I-5’s launched between 2013-2017. 3. SES. Ordered two (2) Space Inspire satellites providing video and data coverage in the EMEA region. 4. JSAT. Split orders for Airbus (Superbird 9) and TAS (JSAT 31), providing data and video capacity for Southeast Asia. 5. Optus. Ordered one sorely needed satellite in 2020 that is optimistically two years late, prompting Optus and customers like Sky New Zealand to look for alternative satellites. The lack of affordable and easy-to-produce – at least by spacecraft standards – software-defined satellites leaves GEO operators in a bind. LEO constellations, especially vertically integrated ones like Starlink and Kuiper, are exerting enormous market pressure on established operators. On a cost-per-bit basis, GEO can be competitive with LEO, but it’s hard to win business when assets are stuck on factory floors. *Excludes small GEOs, radio, video, and C-band orders. Includes mixed-use satellites such as Arabsat 7A and Koreasat 6a. SOURCE: https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2024-06-airbus-provides-2024-guidance-update

6/27/2024 - Written by Caleb Henry Two large developments this month are positioning European space companies to receive fresh investments with an angle historically perceived as taboo: “Joint Defense.” On June 24, the European Investment Bank, which historically was banned  from giving money to military companies, said it is mobilizing €6 billion  (US$6.4B) for defense projects such as satellites, drones, and cybersecurity. A week earlier, NATO’s Innovation Fund  began deploying its €1 billion in assets with investments in five European companies – three in the space sector: Isar Aerospace (launch), SpaceForge (space semiconductor production), and iComat (lightweight spacecraft structures). NATO also backed four private venture capital firms in the investment round (Alpine Space Ventures, OTB Ventures, Join Capital, Vsquared Ventures).  The war in Ukraine, now in its third year, has challenged traditional thinking around the defense of the European bloc. Defense budgets for individual European countries pale in comparison to the U.S., meaning European space companies could not hope for the level of support U.S. defense primes enjoy. But joint defense opens up new streams for government funding of space technologies (given the fact that U.S. GDP is ~50% greater than the entire EU block, there won’t be parity between spending levels, but it’s still an improvement). Sitting in the offing remains a proposed €100B bond program  championed by EC Commissioner Theirry Breton, the same politician who spearheaded the European Union’s multi-orbit constellation IRIS2. It’s still unclear if EU members will agree to collective borrowing to finance defense missions, but if the precedent is broken, it could be good news for IRIS2, which is currently stuck in limbo due to cost and financing disputes between the EU and private participants. SOURCE: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240617573406/en/NATO-Innovation-Fund-makes-first-investments-to-secure-the-future-of-the-Alliance%E2%80%99s-1-billion-citizens

6/25/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry It remains an open question when SpaceX will introduce Starship and the Super Heavy booster for satellite launches, but the company’s production rate for the Falcon 9 suggests the 14-year-old rocket will stay as SpaceX’s workhorse vehicle throughout at least 2025. Elon Musk, in a conversation with Tim Dodd (aka The Everyday Astronaut), estimated the company will produce “almost 200” Falcon 9 upper stages this year and “probably over 200” next year. Furthermore, while Starship/Super Heavy will keep doing test flights in 2024, it won’t carry satellites or crews. Per Musk: “The payload for all the flights this year is data." Musk’s statements align with our Quilty Space financial model on Starlink, which projects Falcon 9 will continue to perform the majority of launches for the megaconstellation in the first half of 2025. However, the higher number of upper stages slated for production suggests the Falcon 9 will stay in focus for longer – perhaps all of 2025 – while SpaceX continues to iterate on Starship. Quilty Space continues to expect the first Starship launch carrying Starlink satellites to occur in 2025, concomitant with the introduction of the V3 satellites. Musk said the goal of Starship lofting 100 metric tons to LEO (vs 40-50 tons today) will now come from the Gen-2 version of the rocket. No timeline has been given for the Gen-2, which will be about 20 meters longer than the current iteration and feature hundreds, if not thousands, of improvements. How long it takes to stabilize that vehicle for production will influence how rapidly (or not) SpaceX can scale up the V3 Starlink constellation. With a width of 7 meters, the V3 is too big to fit under the Falcon 9’s 5.2-meter-diameter fairing and may still continue to grow in size as engineers tweak the design while awaiting their ride to orbit. Starship, with a 9-meter fairing has plenty of room for growth. For now, SpaceX’s biggest challenge with Starship is ensuring the vehicle can reliably survive the heat from reentry. SOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFqjoCbZ4ik

6/24/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry A key challenge for any launch company, especially small ones, is maintaining a steady cadence of orders and launches. A solid order flow keeps the factory running smoothly and profitably. A gap in orders inevitably creates challenges for the workforce, suppliers, and profitability. Rocket Lab, the industry’s leading small launch provider, has been uniquely successful in securing multi-launch agreements as a means of avoiding production troughs. Since 2021, Rocket Lab has secured an industry record six (6) multi-launch agreements ranging from three to five missions. Rocket Lab’s most recent deal, with Japanese SAR operator Synspective, was also its largest, at 10 launch missions. Rocket Lab’s success at securing these multi-launch agreements is especially impressive given the need to compete against SpaceX’s Transporter rideshare missions. Announced in 2019, Transporter was originally positioned as a quarterly rideshare mission to an SSO orbit, but SpaceX recently added twice-per-year launches to high-inclination orbits (Bandwagon). Since launching the program, SpaceX has completed 11 rideshare missions (10 Transporter, one Bandwagon), launching 823 of satellites at a list price of $5,500-6,500 per kilogram, the industry’s cheapest launch to LEO by a wide margin. Fortunately, price isn’t the sole determinant in selecting a launch provider. Depending on the operator, schedule, reputation (i.e., reliability), and the ability to launch to unique orbits can often rank higher than price. Several of Rocket Lab’s customers have cited the ability to access less popular orbits as a reason for ordering Electron. This is especially important for customers that operate constellations of 50 or less satellites. These smaller LEO constellations must rely on the precise placement of satellites rather than sheer numbers to achieve their desired coverage. Speaking of which, two days after signing the Synspective deal, Rocket Lab launched five ~30 kg satellites for the French IoT operator Kinéis, which had also signed a five-launch deal. In a 2021 interview, Kinéis CEO Alexandre Tisserant said the company needed precise orbits and that using a rideshare service would have required so much more fuel it would have forced a redesign of the spacecraft . That’s plenty of reason to fly a bespoke mission on Electron. SOURCE: https://synspective.com/press-release/2024/launch-agreement-rocketlab/

5/29/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Telesat’s LEO constellation, Lightspeed, has gone through fits and starts over the past eight years that make gauging its progress difficult, but this week the program took a veritable step forward with the announcement of three new suppliers. Over the past 24 hours, MDA Space disclosed the following hardware vendors that will each build components for Lightspeed’s 156-198 satellites. • Burloak Technologies  of Oakville, Ontario, will supply 50,000+ 3D-printed metal parts  • Rakon  of Aukland, New Zealand, will build an undisclosed number of Master Reference Oscillators  • Tesat  of Backnang, Germany, will provide 792 optical crosslinks   It’s not clear what percentage of Telesat Lightspeed MDA will outsource, as manufacturers vary widely in their approach. At present, it appears Lightspeed will have more outsourced hardware than Amazon or Starlink, but less than OneWeb Gen-1. Telesat also has a 2023 contract with SpaceX for 14 Falcon 9 launches starting in mid-2026, and an agreement with Google-spinoff Aalyria for advanced networking technology. The company will likely need to select suppliers for a few more key elements (if it hasn’t already), such as propulsion units and solar arrays. Telesat’s selection of MDA as prime contractor for Lightspeed in August 2023 was a head-turning moment given the fact that Telesat had selected Thales Alenia Space as the prime two years prior. And just as MDA purchased the digital payload division of SatixFy to reinforce its position with Telesat, Thales Alenia had acquired Beyond Gravity’s opto-electronics business line (in 2016) partially to win the Lightspeed order. Having an enthusiastic prime contractor was not enough to show the program truly advancing, but a diversified supplier base tips the scale. SOURCE: https://www.tesat.de/news/press/941-tesat-selected-by-mda-space-to-deliver-oisl

5/22/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry The European Space Agency is taking a page out of NASA’s playbook. On May 22, ESA announced €25M ($27.1M) contracts to two companies, German startup The Exploration Company and incumbent Thales Alenia Space Italy, to create cargo capsules meant to transport resources to and from future space stations. While ESA’s announcement doesn’t mention it, the agency’s cargo program is the spiritual successor to NASA’s Commercial Cargo Program. The U.S. civil space agency had great success cultivating commercial replacements for the Space Shuttle, restoring cargo transport in 2012, a year after the shuttle retired. For ESA, the new program could end a gap in cargo capability that began in 2014 after the retirement of the Automated Transfer Vehicle. The initial ESA contracts are development funds meant to aid the companies in demonstrating their vehicles with missions to the International Space Station between 2028 and 2030. Precedent suggests ESA's timetable is feasible, but aggressive. It took SpaceX six years (2006-2012) and Orbital Sciences (now Northrop Grumman) five years (2008-2013) to complete their first cargo runs to the ISS. ESA’s contenders have 5.5 years to reach the ISS, with the real possibility that if they are late, the ISS will have de-orbited. Both companies have some experience with cargo vessels – TAS Italy through its contributions to Cygnus and ISS modules, and The Exploration Company through its founder Hélène Huby’s involvement in the Orion capsule. We were slightly surprised to see ESA only select two winners when it previously described the program as open to three. It appears that two other contenders didn’t make the cut. ESA didn't name them, but most likely they were ArianeGroup’s SUSIE (Smart Upper Stage for Innovative Exploration) and RFA Space’s Argo . That’s not necessarily the end of the road for either. NASA originally chose a company called Rocketplane Kistler for cargo missions but swapped them for Orbital Sciences when funding delays became apparent. For ESA, it’s probably a source of comfort to know there are other contenders besides the two it chose, should the agency need backups. Ultimately, Europe’s cargo program is good news for commercial space station companies. A diversity of suppliers should yield lower costs while also providing redundancy in case one or more vehicles have anomalies. Now, we just need those space stations to launch. SOURCE: https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/ESA_signs_contracts_for_commercial_space_cargo_return_service

5/20/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Yesterday, May 19, Starlink announced market approval from the government of Indonesia to provide satellite internet across the world’s largest archipelago. Comprising ~17,000 islands, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country after India, China, and the United States. The island nation has a growing economy – the 16th largest gross domestic product in the world – and has aggressively invested in connectivity infrastructure to bring its population online. In our Starlink report and financial model, Quilty Space identified Indonesia as a future “needle mover” for Starlink subscriber growth. Here’s why: -          A growing middle class. In just 30 years, 80% of Indonesia’s poor rose out of poverty, according to the World Bank. The country now counts 115 million people in its middle class, of which the World Bank classifies 52 million as “ economically secure .” This presents a large addressable market for Starlink, as internet connectivity is a frequent early investment for newly minted middle-class households. -          Treacherous terrain. As the world’s largest island nation, Indonesia is notoriously difficult to connect via traditional terrestrial infrastructure, like fiber and cell towers. Connecting the islands, especially smaller and more rural ones on the country’s eastern half, can be prohibitively expensive. For this reason, satellite operators have flocked to Indonesia as installing satellite antennas is easier and simpler. -          USO familiarity. BAKTI, an arm of Indonesia’s Ministry of Communication and Information, has invested heavily in commercial satcom for Universal Service Obligation (USO) programs to bring internet to far-flung corners of the country. The most prominent example is BAKTI’s backing of the SATRIA-1 GEO satellite with local operator PSN, and the purchase of half the capacity on PSN’s Nusantara Lima satellite. BAKTI continues to issue tenders for satcom and fiber projects (including one just two days ago ). We expect Starlink will soon be involved in Indonesian USO programs, through BAKTI or other avenues. More than half of Starlink’s ~2.7M subscribers are in the United States, but that number has been ticking down as more countries and territories authorize the service. On May 19, Starlink said it also received authorization in Fiji, bringing the number of countries, territories, and markets that can access the service to 99 (note: how Starlink defines territories and markets is unclear, as eight weeks ago, the company said it had 72 countries approved) . Indonesia could be the country that tips Starlink’s international subscribers over the 50% mark. Already Starlink has a deal with the Indonesian government to improve connectivity for health and education sectors. The nation’s fledgling middle class presents a target-rich market for consumer connectivity. And, with Indonesia’s proximity to the five busiest cargo harbors in the world (four in China, one in Singapore), it's a key market for maritime connectivity, a sector where Starlink has swiftly gained market share. With Indonesian market access secured, the last big needle-moving country awaiting authorization is India, the world’s most populous country . Starlink is reportedly close to gaining the last required Indian government approval, completing a lengthy and famously difficult process for foreign satellite operators.  SOURCE: https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-bali-elon-musk-starlink-internet-service-8444ca8b5da4f4a9973a66f8fd1d3e0f

5/15/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry What Quilty Space identified as a risk for Amazon’s Project Kuiper two years ago is now a concern the U.S. military shares: can new rockets scale in time to meet program schedules? Frank Calvelli, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, who leads space acquisition and integration, wrote a letter to United Launch Alliance’s co-owners, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, expressing concern that their joint venture won’t be able to launch 25 missions the DoD needs by 2027. Calvelli’s letter, submitted May 10, was discovered by the press May 13. Quilty’s Take: we say Calvelli’s concerns are justified by looking at the early launch cadence of four flagship rockets: Europe’s Ariane 5, Rocket Lab’s Electron, SpaceX’s Falcon 9, and ULA’s own Atlas 5. History shows these rockets averaged less than three launches a year during their first five years, regardless of rocket size, financing, or experience with previous vehicles. ULA needs to triple that historical launch rate for DoD alone, not counting the 38 Vulcan launches the company has for Amazon. Can ULA clear this hurdle? It will be tough, but there’s reason to believe the answer is yes. In support of Project Kuiper, ULA is doubling its launch infrastructure at Cape Canaveral. The company says it has “nearly 30 launch vehicles” in production right now (how many are the last ~17 Atlas 5s is unclear). ULA said in 2022 it was also adding a second robotic assembly line for Centaur-5 upper stages. Plus, the Centaur-5’s upgraded RL10C-X twin engines feature a marked increase in 3D-printed components , which should accelerate production. That said, concerns persist around the ability of ULA’s first-stage engine supplier, Blue Origin to deliver a steady stream of BE-4s, a key gating factor for the Vulcan program for years. While Vulcan’s debut flight in January was a “ perfect mission ,” per ULA CEO Tory Bruno, Blue Origin and ULA will need to ramp production rapidly if they hope to meet customer timing needs. Throwback: Subscribers curious about our original analysis titled “Quilty Industry Brief - $5+ Billion Reasons Why Amazon Kuiper is Real,” published Wednesday April 6, 2022 can email us for review. SOURCE: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/13/pentagon-worried-ula-vulcan-development/?pwapi_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJyZWFzb24iOiJnaWZ0IiwibmJmIjoxNzE1NTcyODAwLCJpc3MiOiJzdWJzY3JpcHRpb25zIiwiZXhwIjoxNzE2OTU1MTk5LCJpYXQiOjE3MTU1NzI4MDAsImp0aSI6IjU3MTUyMzg0LTA0OGMtNGI3OC1hMDQ3LTdkMWViMjYwZDcwOCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lndhc2hpbmd0b25wb3N0LmNvbS90ZWNobm9sb2d5LzIwMjQvMDUvMTMvcGVudGFnb24td29ycmllZC11bGEtdnVsY2FuLWRldmVsb3BtZW50LyJ9.e1uqlwNZY2foBluJcdD8kJ26crolsdygHG5VtjZgz8I

5/8/2024 - Written By Chris Quilty Very high-resolution (VHR) satellite imagery, defined as 50cm or better resolution, has historically been a rare and prized resource. Before the launch of two Maxar Legion satellites on May 2, 2024, there were only 14 commercially operated VHR satellites on orbit. Six of these satellites are operating beyond their design life (by an average of ~8 years!), while another five have less than three years of remaining design life. Meanwhile, demand for VHR imagery has arguably never been higher due to roiling global conflicts and the emergence of new AI/ML tools that can extract even greater value from imagery. And, better data (i.e., better resolution) results in better analysis. As profiled in our EO Sector Spotlight VHR report published in 3Q 2022, the twin Legion satellites launched last week represent the vanguard of 100+ VHR satellites that could be launched over the next four years. This total includes large constellations like Planet’s Pelican (32 satellites) and Airbus's renewed commitment, unveiling its Pléiades Neo Next program on April 29 with one satellite already in production and subsequent plans to deliver “new satellite assets and capabilities.” For now, Maxar will remain king of the VHR hill, with four more Legions ready for launch and potentially two more in early construction. Only Airbus (Pléiades Neo 3&4) and ISI (EROS C3) have similar 30cm capability. Despite the recent Legion launch and the big industry plans for new VHR capacity, near-term VHR supply is more likely to contract than expand. Six of today's VHR satellites are operating beyond their design life and will soon run out of fuel. Airbus is 2 to 3 years out from adding capacity. BlackSky will launch its first 35 cm Gen 3 satellite in late 2024, with an uncertain (cash-dependent) launch rate thereafter. Satrec Initiative launches its 30 cm SpaceEye-T early in 2025 but has limited commercial reach. Beyond that, Pelican will need at least a half dozen satellites in orbit to dent the market. Maybe late-2025? Importantly, Maxar has 100% commercial access to the Legion fleet. That is, until WorldView 1 & 2 (launched in 2007 and 2009) finally tap out, and Legion capacity is needed for EOCL commitments. The degree to which Maxar can successfully grow the market vs. simply stealing share from the HR market could weigh heavily in sustained investment in large VHR constellations. SOURCE: https://www.maxar.com/press-releases/first-two-worldview-legion-spacecraft-performing-well-after-launch

5/7/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry In years past, small countries often financed geostationary satellites under the auspices of national sovereignty. Commercial satellite operators found themselves competing with new state players for whom a commercial business case seemed irrelevant, leading to the term “ PrideSats ,” as national pride seemed to be the biggest motivator (think Bangabandhu-1 for Bangladesh, or Tupak Katari 1 for Bolivia). In 2024, will Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations become the new PrideSats? A bellwether for this behavior is Taiwan, which has longstanding trust issues with Elon Musk over his opinions on and connections to China, and has consequently rejected Starlink. The island of 23 million people is now actively contemplating a domestic LEO constellation. If Taiwan pushes forward with a constellation, it could encourage other countries to follow suit. To date it’s been the typical suspects deploying or planning government LEO broadband constellations – The U.S., the EU, Russia and China. Can smaller nations follow suit? We find this will be challenging for the following reasons: • Coverage physics.  LEO constellations inherently require dozens to hundreds of satellites to ensure consistent coverage. Nations that build LEO networks need a global, or at the very least, a large regional use case as justification, otherwise they will spend large amounts for capacity that won’t get used.   • Limited orbital real estate.  LEO stretches from 200-2,000km, but many of the ideal orbits are already claimed or populated by Starlink, Amazon, SDA, OneWeb and Telesat. What’s left is mainly either vLEO, where atmospheric ablation becomes an issue, orbits between Starlink and SDA, where large debris is a threat, or above OneWeb, where radiation levels climb. Put simply, there is not enough room in LEO for dozens of proliferated constellations (unless operators become extremely adept at avoiding collisions and/or trust each other enough to allow for orbits closer than what operators, and perhaps regulators, tolerate today).   • High cost barriers.  While GEO PrideSats were expensive, $200-300M could get a satellite built, launched and operated. For LEO constellations, that funding is the starting point. Unless nations are prepared to spend billions, potentially on a recurring basis, the fiscal requirements will be too much.   These high barriers could benefit existing commercial LEO operators. Already Taiwan is using OneWeb for emergency communications, and South Korea, through Hanwha’s investment in OneWeb, has obtained a degree of sovereign LEO capability. Israel’s Ministry of Communications said May 7 it is buying Starlink services and testing OneWeb with domestic GEO operator Spacecom. Quilty Space won’t be surprised to see a handful of nations attempt sovereign LEO constellations, but the more likely outcome is nations banding together (like the E.U.’s IRIS2), buying into existing LEOs (Hanwha/OneWeb), or accepting that sovereign connectivity can come from higher orbits like MEO or GEO. SOURCE: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/04/asia/taiwan-starlink-intl-hnk/index.html

5/1/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry In a year marked by budget atrophy at NASA, NOAA-OSC, and the Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) was a notable outlier. The organization, tasked by the Pentagon to accelerate commercial tech adoption across the U.S. military, received a 9x FY24 budget increase from $104M to $946M. DIU has six core focus areas , one of which is space. In a recent Q&A, DIU Space Portfolio Director Steve “Bucky” Butow emphasized a greater need for scalable commercial solutions and less “exquisite” hardware. DIU has helped to foster tech that went into the Space Development Agency’s pLEO constellation, and has a strong interest in projects that already have private backing. We suspect that a meaningful portion of DIU’s newfound funding will go towards bolstering existing areas of interest. Some key areas to watch include: • OTV and fuel depots.  Three companies (Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman, and SpaceBilt, formerly Skycorp),  received DIU contracts  in March to advance Orbital Transfer Vehicles (OTVs) and in-space refueling technologies that can serve commercial and military customers. Notably, DIU expressed a desire for an orbiting fuel depot with chemical and/or electric propellant that was apparently not awarded in that round. We would not be surprised to see a fuel depot program follow these three orders. • Hypersonic test platforms.  Rocket Lab, in partnership with Australian startup Hypersonix, and Fenix Space, a California startup, are developing low-cost hypersonic test platforms for DIU’s Hypersonic and High-Cadence Airborne Testing Capabilities ( HyCAT ) program. Last year DIU  expanded HyCAT  to include experimental cruise flight systems from Hermeus and Innoveering, a GE Aerospace company. Given DoD concern about a paucity of U.S. hypersonics capabilities, this area is likely to see increased attention. • Responsive launch.  In February, Firefly completed DIU’s Victus Nox mission by launching a Millennium Space satellite within 24 hours’ notice. DIU’s next responsive space mission,  Victus Haze , sets up a more audacious test of rendezvous and proximity operations by Rocket Lab and True Anomaly. With a larger budget, will DIU go for a hat trick? • Satcom networking.  DoD already uses a lot of connectivity, but much of the gear is specialized, requiring lots of disparate radios and hardware. DIU has been striving to advance a connected battlespace, where comms are  seamless across systems  (government and commercial). Tighter integration between these networks, and between orbits, is a probable focus of continued investment. SOURCE: https://spacenews.com/diu-helps-orchestrate-pentagon-innovation-enterprise/

4/25/2024 - Written By Chris Quilty Defense News officially confirmed a long-circulating industry rumor. Raytheon is done chasing SDA prime contracts. This represents a reversal from the company’s recent acquisition strategy, taking Raytheon off the table as Terran Orbital’s White Knight. In November 2020, only 20 months after the formation of the Space Development Agency (SDA), and with prospective billion-dollar smallsat contracts hanging in the balance, Raytheon acquired Blue Canyon Technology (BCT) for $350 million. BCT, a 12-year-old startup founded by former Ball engineers to build star trackers, was EBITDA profitable with revenues of $50-100M. At the time, BCT was viewed as one of the early success stories of the (2010s) newspace revolution. A year later, Raytheon acquired SEAKR Engineering, a Colorado-based satellite component manufacturer (RF, processing, storage, space electronics, and subsystems, but no buses), for an estimated 2-3x the purchase price of BCT. SEAKR also brought along highly coveted digital payload technology. So why is Raytheon abandoning its pursuit of SDA prime contracts following a $250M award , 7-satellite award, and three-and-a-half years after spending more than $1B for two platform companies to pursue business? Was it merely the fact that BCT specialized in cubesats, with less heritage on microsatellite class platforms, and SDA was looking for ESPA-Grande's (i.e., up to 700 kg vs. ~25 kg for a 16U cubesat)? To chase an SDA contract, Raytheon would need to mature the design for an all-new bus and compete against two dozen other vendors to win a coveted SDA contract. More likely, Raytheon concluded that there is a better risk-adjusted return from selling picks-and-shovels (i.e., components and systems) than full-blown satellites. Both BCT and SEAKR have promising merchant component opportunities, but if Raytheon becomes a prime, many of BCT/SEAKR’s customers will come to perceive them (Raytheon) as a competitor. Better to just sell parts. And BCT continues to offer its cubesat/mircrosat product line. It's the right call. We just hope Raytheon didn’t base its original acquisition strategy on the assumption of an SDA win. If they did, it’ll be a long road to generate an attractive return on Raytheon’s original investment. Another way to engineer a save would be to double down on the components business through M&A with the aim of attaining proprietary capabilities or scale advantage, especially in a world with fewer tier-twos than ever. SOURCE: https://www.defenseone.com/business/2024/04/rtx-moves-away-competing-prime-space-contracts/396016/

4/18/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry What started as a binary battle between DTD spectrum approaches is increasingly looking like an “and” rather than an “or” outcome. One year ago, the battles lines were drawn between MSS operators pushing the adoption of specialized DTD chips into phones (Apple/Globalstar and Qualcomm/Iridium) and Mobile Network Operators repurposing cellular spectrum for use from space (T-Mobile/Starlink and AT&T/AST SpaceMobile). Now, both approaches appear to be progressing along parallel paths to serve different roles and markets. Android Authority, a respected outlet for green-bubble smartphone news, reported April 14 that Google’s next phone, the Pixel 9, will include Samsung’s Exynos Modem 5400 for satellite-enabled messaging. Samsung already confirmed in 2023 that its next flagship phones will have satellite messaging, also based on its modems. And several Chinese smartphones like the Oppo Find X7 and the ZTE Axon 60 Ultra have satellite connectivity (ZTE’s phone uses China Satcom’s regional Tiantong MSS system in GEO). Smartphone OEMs are finding it increasingly important to have satellite SOS as a selling feature, but these services rely on narrowband connectivity, meaning the signal is strong but the data rates are low. That’s great for emergencies, but a fuller DTD experience with data and video requires more bandwidth, like the approach AST, SpaceX and others are pursuing. This bifurcation has long existed in satcom, with companies like Globalstar, Iridium, Thuraya, and Viasat providing indispensable safety services from L- and S-band (narrowband) spectrum to planes, boats and warfighters. Satellite operators using higher bandwidth frequencies (C-, Ku-, Ka-) provide more robust internet services, but lack the resiliency required for emergency services. Both coexist. Similarly, DTD for SOS and high-bandwidth applications are moving in tandem. SpaceX launched six prototype DTD satellites in January, followed by six operational DTD satellites April 6. AST SpaceMobile received $155 million in strategic investments from AT&T, Google and Vodafone in January as the company works through supply chain issues to launch five satellites later this year. How DTD solutions will be adopted is still evolving, but the emerging pattern in 2024 is that the inevitable industry shakeout should see at least two winners. SOURCE: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2024/04/the-pixel-9-reportedly-gears-up-for-satellite-sos-support/

4/12/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry After watching startups launch dozens to hundreds of small imaging satellites in Low Earth Orbit, the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office is getting in on the action. The spy agency has six launches planned this year for a proliferated LEO constellation, marking a shift from demonstrations to operations. Specifics about the constellation, like how many satellites, their size, resolution and sensor suite remain unknown. NRO is a large consumer of optical imagery, mainly through the 10-year Electro-Optical Commercial Layer (EOCL) program that split billions of dollars of contracts between BlackSky, Maxar and Planet. The agency has also doled out a series of smaller study contracts across the industry for radar, hyperspectral, and RF mapping data. So why build a government-run constellation, and is it a threat to industry? Probably not. If anything, the NRO constellation is an endorsement of the commercial sector’s approach to EO. The agency is already the largest customer of BlackSky, Planet and Maxar, because it has a large appetite for responsive, high resolution/VHR imagery. What the NRO constellation proves is that the commercial sector has demonstrated a capability with such strong utility that the agency wants even more than what’s available. DoD’s latest Commercial Space Integration Strategy , released April 2, categorizes Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) as a “hybrid mission area,” meaning some functions will be government-led, while others performed by commercial players. We've seen rapid growth in the commercial sector’s ability to field ISR sensors. It's only natural NRO would do the same. Assuming NRO is holding to its oft stated M.O. “buy what we can, build what we must,” then this constellation will enable capabilities that can’t be bought commercially. We're speculating here, but NRO may not have to make the typical industry tradeoff of many lower-resolution satellites (Planet) or a few high-resolution sensors (Maxar). Absent market forces, the agency may have the wherewithal to field a large constellation of powerful satellites too expensive for commercial operators to deploy. Or it could deploy satellites with multiple sensors (optical, SAR, hyperspectral, RF mapping) on the same platform. The point is, NRO can have its cake and eat it, too. SOURCE: https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2024/04/09/spy-agency-eyes-may-launch-of-first-proliferated-constellation/

4/8/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Sierra Space on April 5 announced a trio of satellite platforms meant to meet the needs of any orbit. The news follows three months after the company won a marquee contract to provide 18 LEO missile-warning satellites for the U.S. Space Development Agency, signaling a return to high-volume manufacturing after more than a decade (Orbcomm Gen 2). The new Eclipse platforms (Velocity on the small end, Horizon for middleweights, and the self-described Titan at the heavy end), mark two notable changes: a shift away from an intense focus on Medium Earth Orbit, and an increased appetite for commercial sales. • Less MEO, more everything else.  Less than four years ago, Sierra Space (then Sierra Nevada Corp.) released satellite platform duo mainly  geared towards MEO . That’s not a huge market – just GPS, the rare communications network, and some military sensors – and there was little to show for the effort. Sierra Space’s new line up appears to be a shift towards greater versatility with options for all orbits. Eclipse Titan, the largest platform, bears strong visual similarity to Sierra’s older  SN-1000 , including a heavy emphasis on an ESPA ring core.  • Implications for industry.  Sierra Space is experiencing a rebirth in satellite sales and is expanding from defense into commercial (and potentially civil space), a move that could transform the company into an emerging competitor for many smallsat manufacturers. Comparing the company’s 2020 platforms announcement to today’s, Sierra Space used the word “commercial”  eight times  in its April 5 announcement, compared to  only twice  during the 2020 news (and both were in the company description blurb). Satellite manufacturers often seek to smooth out lumpy business through diversifying customer sets. For Sierra Space to do so, that means more competition among small satellite providers like York, Airbus (FKA the AOS JV), and Rocket Lab. In the commercial small GEO space, that could also mean competition with Astranis, Swissto12, and Terran Orbital.  • Lingering MEO opportunity?  Larger aperture notwithstanding, Sierra Space is likely still eyeing opportunities in MEO, especially since the Space Force  wants new missile tracking satellites  there. That puts the company in the ring with L3Harris, Millenium, and RTX. The Space Force is also studying  smaller, cheaper GPS satellites , which could present another opportunity should it transition to a proliferated architecture in future years.   SOURCE: https://www.sierraspace.com/newsroom/press-releases/sierra-space-unveils-the-revolutionary-eclipse-satellite-bus-line-introducing-velocity-horizon-and-titan/

4/1/2024 - Written By Caleb Henry Companies are often reluctant to name-drop their competitors, but it’s no secret that virtually every satellite communications operator is squaring up against Starlink. Telesat CEO Dan Goldberg didn’t mince words on the company’s March 28 earnings call, saying the Canadian operator is facing Starlink “everywhere,” most acutely in competition for maritime vessels. The acknowledgement is notable, because a longstanding argument employed by Goldberg and other Telesat executives was that Lightspeed, the company’s future LEO constellation of 156-198 satellites, is designed for markets that Starlink isn’t. By painting Starlink as a consumer-first network, Telesat can emphasize Lightspeed’s differentiation for the enterprise and mobility-networks. Other satellite operators have done the same, but it’s increasingly apparent they will all face direct competition with Starlink, if they aren’t already. Goldberg’s discussion of Telesat’s competition with Starlink is an important bellwether for the industry as to where Starlink is most aggressive today, and where it will be in the future. Those areas include: Intense competition: Maritime, particularly cruise ships . Goldberg said Telesat is seeing intense competition here, and he’s not alone. Maritime competition with Starlink has been most strongly felt by SES, whose O3b constellation in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) serves many of the world’s largest cruise lines. Even amongst smaller ships, Starlink has cemented its presence since activating maritime service in 2022, as evidenced by Starlink reseller strategies adopted by KVH, Marlink, and Speedcast. Medium competition: cellular backhaul. While GEO excels in providing five-nines reliability (a critical MNO requirement), LEO networks have an advantage in providing lower latency (<100 ms vs 600-800 ms for GEO). Goldberg indicated that Telesat is seeing Starlink going for “backhaul requirements on certain networks.” That said, until Starlink can provide sufficient reliability, we expect the nod will continue to go to GEO. Once fully deployed, Starlink’s DTD service could represent a different type of competition for the cellular backhaul market. Light competition: corporate networks. Goldberg described corporate business customers as a less affected vertical in Telesat’s business. This may be thanks to Telesat’s entrenched position with customers who have relied on the company for years of remote connectivity across Canada and other geographies. Starlink has a business connectivity offering, but it is admittedly less attention grabbing, perhaps because it has fewer marquee deals announced compared to other enterprise and mobility segments. Starlink is also active in government, inflight connectivity (IFC), and of course, consumer internet. As the company deepens its presence beyond consumer markets, traditional satellite operators will need to craft strategies to compete with a well-capitalized, agile alternative. Telesat expects to even the playing field with the launch of its first Lightspeed satellites in June 2026, with service following by the end of 2027. Will Lightspeed tip the scales back in Telesat’s favor? SOURCE: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4681081-telesat-corporation-tsat-q4-2023-earnings-call-transcript

3/29/2024 - Written By Justin Cadman SpaceX is eyeing another segment of the space economy for disruption. Last week, speaking at a panel at the Satellite 2024 event, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell unveiled a new optical communications terminal (OCT) product offering, which SpaceX calls “Plug and Plaser.” Acknowledging the new foray into product sales, Shotwell said, "We generally don't sell components, so this is a little bit of a new thing for us." With its track record of rapid innovation, efficiency, and rock-bottom costs, SpaceX could rapidly become a formidable competitor in the emerging OCT market. OCTs, enabling optical inter-satellite links (O-ISLs), are mission-critical to proliferated defense constellations (e.g., SDA PWSA) and to future commercial LEO broadband constellations alike. And in some ways, SpaceX has an early lead in OCTs, ramping from on-orbit testing in 2021 to wide-scale deployment by early 2024, boasting 9,000 “space lasers” (OCTs) on-orbit pushing over 42 Petabytes/day of data. Does Shotwell’s announcement signify a paradigm shift at SpaceX – i.e., is the company poised to become a merchant supplier of high-volume, low-cost spacecraft components, leveraging its enormous Starlink production scale to drive lucrative new product revenue streams? Recent OCT merchant supplier prices are ~$300K per LEO OCT, suggesting BOM plus AIT costs of maybe $125-150K, but SpaceX’s internal OCT costs are significantly lower. It could garner market share quickly. The entry of SpaceX as a merchant supplier, first into OCTs and later into other component arenas, would have profound implications for the space industrial base. As it turns out, this is not SpaceX’s likely intent. The size and the nature of the components opportunity makesmerchant supply a very unlikely priority for the company on a standalone basis. Presentations by Mynaric, a pure-play OCT leader, suggest that the laser comms market will reach ~$1 billion in size around ~2026. While not a pittance (and quite attractive for companies like Mynaric), this is hardly a game-changing motivator for SpaceX to shift its highly successful business model. We believe that (1) driving interoperability standards and (2) introducing a powerful new Starlink “on-ramp” are the real motivations behind SpaceX’s recent surprise announcement. A clue to the interoperability driver is Space-BACN, DARPA’s attempt to create an “internet” of LEO satellites, enabling seamless communication between military/government and commercial/civil satellite constellations that currently are unable to talk with each other. A number of leading companies (including SpaceX) are involved in the Space-BACN program. SpaceX success in pushing its space laser approach commercially could help put SpaceX into the driver’s seat for future OCT/O-ISL standards. Regardless of whether it becomes the ultimate technical standard-bearer industry-wide, SpaceX surely sees a lucrative opportunity to drive network traffic onto Starlink via integration of its OCTs onto others’ spacecraft. Other commercial and military customers can leverage SpaceX OCTs to backhaul their traffic via the Starlink network, creating both a stronger Starlink ecosystem and an attractive potential new revenue source for the company (at the same time potentially boosting other SpaceX initiatives, like Starshield). Spacecraft component companies, including OCT vendors, can breathe a sigh of relief for now. SpaceX isn’t barging into your front door with its latest announcement, but it looks like it may be trying to sneak in the back. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/spacex-says-plans-sell-satellite-laser-links-commercially-2024-03-19/

3/26/2024 - Written By Kimberly Siversen Burke Netherlands-based IoT innovator, previously known as Magnitude Space, rebranded to "Hiber" in 2017, drawing inspiration from the idea of its modems entering a dormant state akin to “ hibernating bears ” between signal transmissions. This foreshadowed a period of dormancy during which the company was honing its strength. Today, Hiber’s renaming looks more like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Awakening to a Sharpened Focus & Renewed Mission It’s no surprise that the once-promising AWS Commercial Startup Winner of 2018 slept right through COVID after its first four cubesats failed. But the company’s recent acquisition of Parisian-based IoT hardware provider Srett Industrie is what caught us off guard. Many had written off the Dutch IoT hopeful after it scrapped its constellation plans in 2021, and its merger with Swiss smallsat operator Astrocast tanked the following year. But Hiber’s history of starts and stops is marked by a few pivots toward profitability along the way: • In late 2020, Hiber partnered with  WTS Energy  to develop and launch a subscription-based IoT solution for remote monitoring of oil & gas wells and pipelines. Designed for off-grid (no cellular connectivity, so limited availability to deploy NB-IoT), the “HiberHilo” platform is an out-of-the-box, plug-and-play solution. It includes compact, low-power, battery-operated sensors connected to wellheads. The sensors route data via LoRaWAN (long-range, frequency-hopping, and unregulated sub-GHz spectrum) to the  Hiberband  gateway, which then uplinks to third-party satellites, including  Inmarsat’s.  End users access the data on Hiber’s remote dashboard. HiberHilo is scalable to ~500 sensors per oil platform, and because the equipment is leased, there is no capex investment. • Shell Oil tapped Hiber in  2021  for global well integrity monitoring, deploying HiberHilo at about  250  remote and offshore wellheads. • In 2022, HiberHilo won a  Digital Innovation of the Year Award . • Hiber earned the financial backing of  Finch Capital  subsidiary FC Space in 2023. • In the March 18, 2024,  announcement  of Hiber’s acquisition of Srett to expand its R&D and manufacturing capabilities, the combined company is reportedly already serving “eight of the 10 global oil & gas and hydrogen majors in all continents.” As a private company, details about Hiber’s claims of “profitability” are impossible to quantify. But the bear’s emergence from a dark cave of $33M + in losses to a scalable IoT solutions provider serves as a reminder to startups: sometimes the path to success is not through relentless hustle… but rather a thoughtful hibernation followed by a strategic wake-up call. SOURCE: https://quilty.globalspaceexchange.com/dashboard/Hiber%20Acquires%20Srett%20Industrie%20to%20Accelerate%20the%20Roll-Out%20of%20Environmental%20and%20Integrity%20Solutions